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Rapporteur: Mr DELLA CROCE REMOVAL OF FISCAL FRONTIERS 
Eight Opinions on the harmonization of indirect taxation 
The Economic and Social Committee voted by a very large majority in favour of the 
harmonization of indirect taxation as  from  1 January 1993. The approval of this fiscal 
package proposed by  the Commission is in keeping with the stands taken by the Committee 
in this area over the last ten years. While giving its approval the Committee made various 
requests for clarification, specific suggestions and  comments of a technical nature the 
significance of which will not be lost on those who are required to implement and apply the 
decisions taken by the Community in one of  the areas which most directly affect  the citizens 
and economic operators of Europe. 
1.  The Committee has in the past repeatedly reaffirmed its support for the establishment 
of  the internal market and the removal of fiscal frontiers. As early as 19781 in its Information 
Report on Tax Harmonization111 
I  the Committee stressed the advantages of harmonization 
in this field and said that it was a unique opportunity to make significant headway towards 
a rational and at the same time less burdensome tax system more in keeping with the interests 
of both the individual citizen and the tax authorities and avoiding the taxpayer discontent 
which results from a lack of transparency in the tax system. 
For the economy in general and for the tax authorities a rational tax system - and one 
which both services the interests of  the citizen and minimizes costs- is one which manages 
with as few operations and resources as possible and is still as fair as is humanly possible. 
In its Opinion on Completion of the Internal Market - Commission White Paper of 27 
November 1985121 -the Committee reiterated its support for the Commission in its attempt 
finally to abolish frontier checks by reducing indirect tax divergences. On that occasion the 
Committee  already  highlighted  the  various  problems  which  are  to  be  found  in  the 
Commission's current proposals on the harmonization of indirect taxation. 
In its Opinions on the Proposal for imposing a standstill on VAT and excise duties of 
22 May 1986131, on financial integration in the Community of 27 November 1986141 and on 
turnover taxes applicable to small and medium-sized business of 28 January 1987151, the 
Committee pointed out that the harmonization of indirect taxation must be considered as 
a necessary step towards a true common market. This harmonization must be structured 
to include generous transitional phases, and where necessary compensatory measures; its 
aim  must be  a gradual  alignment of those aspects of taxes connected  with financial 
integration. 
Tax structures and even concepts of taxation vary enormously; nonetheless, action 
must aim to achieve the maximum fiscal neutrality  I  to allow capital movements to be guided 
by economic decisions rather than by tax considerations. 
(  1)  Rapporteur: Mr FREDERSDORF, ICES 846/78 of 12 July 1978). 
(21  Rapporteur: Mr POETON- Co-Rapporteur: Mr ROUZIER (OJ No. C 344 of 31  December 19851. 
131  Rapporteur: Mr DELLA CROCE ICES 500/86). 
(4)  Rapporteur: Mr DRAGO ICES 970/86). 
(51  Rapporteur: Mr BROICHER (CES 95/87). Turning to direct taxation, the Committee stressed the advisability of aligning the 
incidence of tax burdens so that production costs, siting of investment and capital return 
are not significantly influenced by the tax systems of the Member States. In the area of tax 
problems, the Committee drew the attention of the Commission and the Council to the 
problems of international tax fraud and tax havens. 
2.  On  11  September 1987 the Council decided to consult the Economic and  Social 
Committee on the global Communication from the Commission on completion of the internal 
market: approximation of indirect tax rates and harmonization of indirect tax structures 
(C0M(87) 320 final) and on a series of eight draft Regulations and Directives on rates of 
VAT and excise duty. 
The Commission's response to the challenge posed by completion of the internal 
market. 
3.  In  January 1985 the Commission undertook to draw up and  carry out a detailed 
programme for the dismantling of the Community's internal frontiers. The present package 
is not intended to  bring into being an ideal tax system for the Community but simply to remove 
fiscal frontiers. The Commission has therefore adopted a pragmatic approach to the approx-
imation and structure of VAT rates, derogations and exemptions, zero-rating, excise duties, 
the overall budgetary effect and the implementation timetable. 
The Committee's support for the Commission's proposals. 
4.  The Committee fully endorses the aim of removing all frontiers and all border checks 
by 1 January 1  993, including those checks now made for the collection of indirect taxes 
(VAT and excise duties). The Committee is pleased that the Commission has adopted a 
pragmatic approach. 
It may be necessary to adopt some interim measures to obtain agreement from Member 
States, in particular derogations for zero-rating or for higher rates in countries with particular 
revenue needs. Although there is a case for an extended time period, it is generally desirable 
to work to the 1992 deadline. 
The Committee regrets that the Commission has not found a solution to a whole array 
of  technical problems (supervision of the actual collection of VAT in trade, budget and social 
problems, clearing system, etc.) which give rise to concern about whether the planned 
abolition of tax frontiers would actually be an improvement on the present situation, which 
is one of rigorous observance of equal competition in Community trade. 
It is important that public support be generated for proposals to complete the internal 
market. Political leaders in the Member States should be engaged in stressing the economic 
benefits which will arise following the completion of the internal market. 
2 Tax convergence is not the only prerequisite for European integration but should be 
seen as part of the total process of trying to achieve economic and social cohesion and 
monetary and political union. 
The specific VAT proposals. 
5.  The five and six percentage point bands proposed in the draft Directive on the approx-
imation of VAT rates (C0M(87) 321 final/2) appear to be too wide for goods and services 
supplied to final customers. 
Since after the abolition of intra-Community frontiers final customers will be able to 
purchase goods freely in any Member State, competition may be seriously distorted by such 
differences in rates. 
It must not be forgotten here that final consumers include not only private individuals 
but also public authorities, other organizations not entitled to deduct input tax and firms 
which, by virtue of being small etc., are not entitled to deduct input tax. 
The  proposed bands should therefore be  narrowed. If not all  Member States can 
approve an immediate reduction in the bands, the Commission proposal should be regarded 
as only a transitional scheme. 
6.  Apart from purely drafting changes, the Commission proposal on the removal of fiscal 
frontiers (C0M(87) 322 final/2) introduces some new rulings with certain material conse-
quences. These primarily affect provisions which the removal of internal fiscal frontiers will 
render obsolete or which, if retained, would have undesirable results. The provisions on the 
taxation of credit institutions are among the most important Articles. 
7.  The introduction of a VAT clearing mechanism for intra-Community sales (C0M(87) 
323 final/2) is a working document rather than a proposal for a Directive. The Committee 
finds it complex and rather confused. 
The term "removal of fiscal frontiers" used by the Commission in its proposal is likely 
to arouse considerable interest and enthusiasm. However, we must remain aware of the 
difficulties and constraints that lie ahead, and avoid illusions. As Europe is still far from being 
a political unit, the single  market will have to make allowances for the autonomy and 
prerogatives of the Member States. One of their main prerogatives is that of levying taxes. 
On the other hand it must be remembered that any system for levying taxes on business 
turnover will pose complex problems when it  comes to monitoring. Checks are vital in order 
to ensure fair and equal competition. 
Nevertheless, the Member States have officially undertaken to form a single European 
market. A market guaranteeing freedom of competition and reducing the administrative 
obligations of firms is therefore in the interests of all. 
3 The elimination of tax barriers and the introduction of rules to ensure that VAT is 
collected as if the Community were one and the same country are scheduled for 1  992; it 
might therefore seem that definition of a clearing system is not an urgent matter. 
However, there are two reasons for making an immediate start laying down the details 
of the clearing system: (a) it  1s a key component of the overall blueprint and (b) Member States 
need to be given specific assurances that the new system will not place VAT revenue from 
imported goods in jeopardy and that VAT will continue to be charged on final consumption. 
8.  With regard to the process of convergence of VAT and excise duty rates (C0M(87) 
324 final/3), by 1992 all Member States should have two VAT rates, varying within precise 
limits, and should set single excise duty rates. It  therefore seems ill-judged simply to formalize 
the obligation not to widen existing divergences and to"  allow" movement towards the rates 
scheduled for 1992. 
Given the difficulties which Member States have had in the past when amending their 
tax systems, there is a danger of arriving at 1  992 with the present situation virtually 
unaltered. This would pose a serious threat to harmonization, as it would mean carrying out 
a complex and onerous operation in one fell swoop. It would seem more sensible to propose 
a Directive which formally obliges all Member States to move gradually towards the final goal. 
The present divergences from the harmonized rates (in minimum and maximum figures) 
should thus be calculated. They should then be phased out in annual stages to be calculated 
in percentage terms. Achievement of the final goal could even be scheduled for a date after 
1992, as this would seem unlikely to seriously hinder the removal of tax frontiers and the 
completion of the single market. 
Not only would gradual harmonization make the operation less risky and onerous; it 
would also mean that the advantages and disadvantages could start being assessed at once. 
The specific excise duty proposals. 
9.  With regard to cigarettes and manufactured tobacco products other than cigarettes 
(COM(87) 325/326 final/2), the lack of alternative schemes, the lack of data and analyses 
of the effects of different taxation regimes and other factors on the tobacco industry and 
the failure to present proposals for the methods of assessment and collection together mean 
that the Economic and Social Committee finds it difficult to reach firm Opinions on the current 
Commission proposals. 
1  0.  The aims of  the Commission's proposals for  the harmonization of rates of excise duty 
of mineral oils (C0M(87) 327 final/2) are welcomed. But the practical achievement of these 
objectives raises problems which the proposal for a Directive fails to solve or which could 
be solved differently. 
4 Products subject to mineral oil excise duty are generally fuels or raw materials used 
as inputs for other products or services. In this sense mineral oil duty is different from other 
types of excise duty which are generally levied directly on the consumer good. 
The adoption of an arithmetic average rate for petrol is not considered appropriate. 
A weighted average would reflect existing tax structures more accurately. 
If for example, as suggested in the Global Commission Communication on the harmoni-
zation of indirect taxes, the intention is to set up tax depots through which all taxable goods 
must pass when entering another Member State, this would amount to the retention of tax 
frontiers. And this would radically alter the views expressed on the excise duty proposals. 
The Commission should therefore submit its proposals with regard to the method of distri-
bution without delay. 
11 .  Adoption of the proposal on alcoholic beverages and the alcohol contained in other 
products (COM(87) 328 final/2) would result in the abolition of border controls although a 
number of significant barriers would still remain. Since products would, as now, be taxed 
at the place of consumption,  a system of customs depots,  national identification tab 
procedures and special way-bills would still be needed. 
Needless to say procedures and regulations should also be standardized in such a way 
that they are not dissimilar to arrangements already in force in each Member State. 
In this connection we must regret the failure of the Commission to propose rules and 
regulations on customs depots or free warehouses. 
5 OPINION 
on the 
Completion of the Internal Market: 
Approximation of Indirect Tax Rates and 
Harmonization of Indirect Tax Structure 
Global Communication from the Commission 
(COM(87) 320 final/2) 
7 Gist of the Commission Proposal 
The package proposed by the Commission is not an attempt to design an ideal fiscal 
system for the Community but merely a blueprint for the abolition of fiscal frontiers. 
The abolition of fiscal frontiers will mean the abolition, in intra-Community trade, 
of the existing system of relieving goods from tax at export and of imposing tax at import, 
as has been the case ever since the First VAT Directive was adopted twenty years ago. 
In addition, the removal of fiscal frontiers necessitates approximation of VAT and 
the main excise duties (on tobacco, mineral oils and alcoholic beverages) if unacceptable 
levels of distortion of competition, diversion of trade, and tax fraud are to be avojded. 
The Commission is also proposing a VAT clearing mechanism to  ensure that, after 
frontier controls have been abolished, the Member States continue to receive the revenue 
to which they are entitled. This will ensure that ouput tax collected on export sales in one 
Member State is passed on to  the Member States in which the supplies are finally consumed. 
There are, of course, other indirect taxes within the Community, such as taxes on 
vehicles, and on the purchase of houses, which vary considerably from Member State to 
Member State. Those variations can be such as to cause distortions of competition and 
deflection of trade. But they do not impede the free movement of goods in the sense that 
the differences between them do not give rise to controls or formalities at frontiers. 
It is intended that Community rates for VAT and excise duties should enter into force 
no later than 31  December 1992. It will be the responsibility of the individual Member States 
to work towards these rates in the intervening period. 
The Commission is however putting forward a Convergence Proposal which aims 
to ensure that Member States do not diverge from the overall objective in the meantime. 
The individual proposals are set out in documents COM(87) 320- 328. 
8 INDIRECT TAXATION 
Rapporteur: Mrs ROBINSON 
OPINION of the Economic and Social Committee (CES 739/88) 
On 11 September 198  7 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee 
under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Global Communication from the Commission on the Completion of the Internal Market: 
Harmonization of Indirect Tax Structure 
(C0M(87) 320 final). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for 
preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 11 and 12  April 1988. 
The Rapporteur was Mrs ROBINSON. 
At  its 257th Plenary Session {meeting of 7 July 1988), the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion by 112 votes to 8 with 11 abstentions: 
1.  Introduction 
The Commission's proposals can be summarized as follows: the creation of an 
internal market will promote economic growth; this requires  (among other things) the 
abolition of fiscal frontiers and to this end the Commission proposes that the concept of 
imports and exports between the Member States should end and that VAT on sales between 
Member States should be as on domestic sales. A clearing house should be established to 
ensure a proper distribution of VAT revenues. In order to prevent distortions of trade and 
competition following the removal of border adjustments for VAT the Commission proposes 
an approximation of VAT rates. Two rates of VAT are proposed with individual countries 
allowed a band of between 14  and 20% standard rate and 4 to 9% reduced rate. The bases 
of excise duties on cigarettes, tobacco, alcohol and mineral oils are to be standardized, and 
the rates equalized. Member States are free to choose their own routes to this goal provided 
that it is attained by 31  December 1992. 
2.  General comments 
2. 1.  The Commission has argued that abolition of "fiscal frontiers" will have a regener-
ative effect on the economy of the European Community and provide economic growth, but 
it has presented little indication on the totality of benefits and disadvantages that may be 
expected. The Commission has not yet collected and collated evidence from Member States 
on the costs (budgetary, social and economic) to them of  the current proposals for harmoni-
zation/approximation of indirect taxation. The Commission should, as a matter of urgency, 
require the Member States to submit the requested reports on the effects of the proposed 
changes, and should draw up an account of the benefits and the costs of the proposals for 
fiscal harmonization. 
2. 2.  In view of the necessity to make arrangements for the removal of fiscal frontiers, 
the Committee greets with great interest the Commission's detailed proposals for Approxi-
mation of Indirect Tax Rates and Harmonization of Indirect Tax Structures outlined in the 
Global Communication under consideration (COM(87) 320 final). 
9 2. 3.  The Committee has already stated in earlier Opinions that it supports fully the 
objective of the creation of the internal market. It is necessary, if this objective is to be 
achieved, that border checks related to fiscal adjustments are eliminated by 1992. 
2.4.  The Committee fully endorses the aim of removing all frontiers and all border checks 
by 1 January 1993  including those checks now made for the collection of indirect taxes due 
(VAT and excise duties). The concepts of "export" and "import" shall cease to apply to 
intra-Community trade. The Committee agrees that this change is necessary to permit free 
movement of goods and services within the Community (see the ESC Opinion on COM 322 
Removal of Fiscal Frontiers). 
2. 5.  The Committee accepts that it may be desirable to create some sort of compen-
sation system such as  a clearing house to assign VAT revenues to Member States.  It 
considers that this proposal still requires further study, as it raises complex problems which 
are not adequately solved by the Commission proposals in their present form. 
2.6.  The Committee's views on the Commission's proposals for excise duties are set 
out in the Opinions on the convergence of rates (COM(87) 324 final), excise duties on alcohol 
(COM(87) 328 final) and excise duties on mineral oils (COM(87) 327 final). It is regretted 
that the Commission has not yet brought forward its views on the operation of the bonded 
warehouse system. 
3.  VAT and competition 
3. 1  .  The provision that VAT on sales between Member States should be charged on 
exactly the same basis as on domestic sales removes the need for border checks in respect 
of trade between VAT  -registered businesses. 
3. 2.  If Member States were left free to set their own rates of VAT there would be no 
distortion of competition between VAT  -registered businesses. The VAT rate would be that 
prevailing in the country of consumption whether a good was home-produced or purchased 
in another Member State. But there would be a problem with cross-border shopping by those 
not registered for VAT, i.e. consumers, and, more generally, the problem of trade between 
Member States by non-VAT registered businesses such as banks and insurance companies, 
public bodies, and some small firms and farmers. 
It  must be ensured, however, that the removal of border checks does not seriously 
disrupt the operation of the Single Market, as the present situation guarantees strict equality 
between countries and products as regards competition. 
3. 3.  If VAT rates were completely harmonized there would be no distortion of compe-
tition between registered businesses. Also tax advantages of cross-border shopping by non-
registered persons would be  eliminated. But complete harmonization would create the 
maximum difficulties for Governments. They would lose all control over indirect taxes. Some 
10 Member States would face acute revenue problems; and Member States could no longer 
pursue their own social objectives or reflect their national traditions through their indirect 
tax rates. 
3.4.  The  Commission has proposed a pragmatic scheme which represents an inter-
mediate position between total freedom and complete harmonization of rates. It may be 
argued that the Commission's proposals are more restrictive on Member States than is 
necessary  to attain the desired objective. The Commission's proposals restrict considerably 
. Member States' freedom to use indirect taxes for revenue or social purposes; they create 
severe revenue problems for some countries such as Ireland and Denmark and conflict with 
the social objectives of other countries such as the United Kingdom and  Portugal. Tax 
structures and  the pattern of government finance would also be thrown into complete 
disarray, as will happen in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 
3. 5.  The extent of cross-border shopping by non-registered persons rests very much on 
geographical considerations. Modifications or  derogations, ought to be permitted if  they do 
not impede the attainment of the objective of removing border controls without distorting 
competition. For example, the United Kingdom and Ireland have no land borders with Member 
States except each other. If both retained zero rating for foodstuffs it seems unlikely that 
this would generate distortion from cross-border shopping. Similarly, it is difficult to see how 
different VAT rates (including zero) on goods and services of an essentially social character 
and principally traded internally within Member States' own borders, would distort compe-
tition. 
3.6.  The Committee therefore urges the Commission to examine alternatives to its 
present proposals. It should look, in particular, at where and in what products cross-border 
shopping for goods and  services by non-registered persons might constitute a serious 
problem. As an alternative it  should also examine methods, such as user taxes, which might 
be adopted to counter the problem. 
4.  Excise duties and competition 
The existing structures and rates of excise duties vary greatly, and the products 
subject to excise duty have a high unit value. Consequently, after 1992 the cross-border 
purchasing power of non-VAT registered  individuals and  traders and  the potential for 
thwarting the fiscal regulations (smuggling) or for fraud will be considerable. This could lead 
to a serious loss of revenue over the Community as a whole. At all events, the harmonization 
of excise duty structures and rates will cause serious problems for some Member States. 
6.  Detailed comments 
5. 1.  Since the Commission's proposals concerning VAT and excise duties present many 
difficulties for Member States, the Commission should present further proposals to eliminate, 
or as far as possible attenuate, such difficulties by means of adequate measures affecting 
budget and social policies and facilitating the transport of goods and persons. 
11 5. 2.  The combined effect of a certain number of the Commission's various detailed 
proposals will cause a substantial increase in fares for intra-Community air and sea passenger 
transport. This will weaken the competitiveness of the Community's internal market in 
tourism.  The  Commission should take these factors into account when  preparing the 
proposed separate Directive on passenger transport. 
5. 3.  Other aspects of the taxation and social security contributions system may be at 
least as distorting to competition as differences in VAT. 
6.  Conclusion 
6. 1.  The Committee welcomes the Commission's pragmatic approach in its -proposal 
on the Approximation of Indirect Tax Rates and Harmonization of Indirect Tax Structure 
whereby fiscal frontiers will be able to be abolished by 1992. 
Whatever decisions are finally made should permit as much flexibility to the Member 
States (to reflect their revenue, social and economic objectives) as is compatible with the 
attainment of free competition in the internal market. The Commission should reconsider 
the need for approximation of VAT rates on goods and services which are not normally traded 
across borders by non-VAT-registered persons and where different VAT rates within the 
Community will not distort competition. In determining precisely what margin of flexibility 
might be permitted to Member States, the Commission should consider alternatives to their 
calculation based on the current rates prevailing. 
6.2.  It may be necessary to adopt measures to obtain agreement from Member States, 
in particular derogations for zero-rating or for higher rates in countries with particular revenue 
needs. Although there is a case for an extended time period, it is generally desirable to work 
to the 1992 deadline. 
The Committee regrets that the Commission has not found a solution to a whole 
array of technical problems (supervision of the actual collection of VAT in trade, budget and 
social problems, clearing system, etc.) which give rise to concern about whether the planned 
abolotion of tax frontiers would actually be an improvement on the present situation, which 
is one of rigorous observance of equal competition in Community trade. 
6. 3.  Greater attention should be given to the need to improve monitoring, control and 
co-ordination of national revenue departments to bring technical standards up to  the highest 
levels so as to eliminate the possibilities for fraud and tax evasion. Control may prove easier 
once centred on local administrations freed from the necessity to concern themselves with 
intra-Community trade flows. Furthermore, once Member States no longer have to employ 
customs staff to deal with intra-Community trade, a far more effective service can be created 
to deal with trade with, and the movement of citizens to and from, third countries, the 
movement of animals and  agricultural products to prevent the spread  of disease, drug 
smuggling and terrorism. 
12 6. 4.  It is important that public support be generated for proposals to complete the internal 
market. Political leaders in the Member States should be engaged in stressing the economic 
benefits which will arise following the completion of the internal market. 
6. 5.  The Committee also considers that the proposals on indirect taxation will in some 
cases give rise to significant changes in the structure of government budgets in the EEC. 
The planned White Paper on direct taxation should be published as rapidly as possible 
and should be the subject of a specific Committee Opinion. 
6.6.  Quite independently of any criticisms of the various micro-economic proposals 
submitted by  the Commission, tax convergence, which clearly must also include direct taxes 
and  parafiscal charges, cannot be considered as an absolute prerequisite for the estab-
lishment of the single market. This will require a global strategy aimed (a) at the parallel elimi-
nation of technical, physical, tax and administrative barriers, and (b) embracing essential 
macro-economic back-up policies. 1992 is not the end of this process, but marks a new and 
significant phase along the way. 
* 
*  * 
N.B. Appendix overleaf. 
13 APPENDIX 
to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
The following amendments, which were supported by at least a quarter of the votes 
cast, were defeated during the debate: 
Page4 
Add at the end of 3.6.: 
Reasons 
"The Commission should also consider whether the tax of  the country of 
destination could be used, instead of  that of  the country of  origin. The fact 
that this  would make matters slightly more complicated would be  far 
outweighed by the elimination of any serious VAT-related distortion of 
competition.  This  system could at least be applied,  in  the form of a 
derogation and possibly on a temporary basis, to the most problematic 
cases: public contracts, mail order and the sale of  registered vehicles." 
Certain Member States have protested vigorously about the distortions of compe-
tition created by the Commission and the cost to  these Member States' budgets of eliminating 
them. In the light of this, it seems extraordinary that the Commission has not sought ways 
of solving the problem. The proposed amendment puts forward what seems the most 
effective solution. 
Voting 
For:  35 II Against: 62 II Abstentions: 1  7 
Page 5, point 6.  1. 
Reason 
14 
Add a new paragraph: 
"The Commission should propose appropriate compensatory measures 
when the loss of  excise revenue in any  Member State  is so significant that 
it creates serious revenue needs, as a direct result of  tax harmonization, 
as well as social and economic difficulties which could lead to wider dispar-
ities between the regions of  the Community. " 
Self explanatory. Voting 
For:  3511 Against: 50 II Abstentions: 21 
Page 6 
At  the end of  the first sentence of 6. 2. after  the words " ... with particular revenue 
needs" add: 
Reasons 
"and derogations for the VAT  system to be used in the case of  non-VAT-
registered persons. " 
Certain Member States have protested vigorously about the distortions of compe-
tition created by the Commission and the cost to  these Member States' budget of eliminating 
them. In the light of this, it seems extraordinary that the Commission has not sought ways 
of solving the problem. The proposed amendment puts forward what seems the most 
effective solution. 
Voting 
For:  33 II Against: 59 II Abstentions: 20 
15 OPINION 
on the 
Proposal for a Counc:il Directive 
supplementing the Common System of Value Added Tax 
and amending Directive 77/388/EEC 
- Approximation of VAT Rates -
(COM (87) 321  final/2) 
17 Gist of the Commission Proposal 
The approximation of VAT rates - a key stage in the tax harmonization necessary 
for achieving the internal market- poses three technical problems, viz. the number of rates 
to be applied, their level and the allocation of products to the rates. 
A dual rate VAT system has been chosen. It is true that, in theory, a single VAT 
rate system is the most simple but since all the Member States (with the exception of 
Denmark and the United Kingdom) apply at least two VAT rates,  a reduced rate and a 
standard rate, it would seem desirable not to upset the tax structure of the majority of 
Member States. 
The standard rate in each Member State can vary between 14% and 20% and the 
reduced rate between 4% and 9%. 
The reduced rate is to be applied to transactions relating to the following goods and 
services: 
- foodstuffs, excluding alcoholic beverages; 
- energy products for heating and lighting, 
-water supplies; 
- pharmaceutical products; 
- books, newspapers and periodicals; 
- passenger transport. 
Number and level of current VAT rates 
Reduced  Standard 
rates  rate 
Belgium 111 1 21  1&6  19 
Denmark 111  22 
France  2.1; 4; 5.5 & 7  18.60 
Germany  7  14 
Greece  6  18 
Ireland 111  2.4 & 10  25 
Italy 111  2&9  18 
Luxembourg  3&6  12 
Netherlands  6  20 
Portugal 111  8  16 
Spain  6  12 
United Kingdom 111  15 
Rates applicable as at 1.4. 1987 
Increased 
rate 






(  1  l Also applies an exemption with a right to refund (i.e. a zero rate) to certain domestic transactions. (N.B. All Member States 
apply the zero rate for exports and like transactions.) 
(2) Also applies an intermediate rate of 17%. 
18 APPROXIMATION OF VAT RATES 
Rapporteur: Mr BROICHER 
OPINION of the Economic and Social Committee (CES 741 /88) 
On  11 September 198  7 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, 
under Article 198 of the EEC Treaty, on the 
Proposal for a Council Directive supplementing the Common System of Value Added Tax 
and amending Directive 77/388/EEC111 - Approximation of VAT Rates 
(COM(87) 321  final/2). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for 
preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 17  May 1988. The 
Rapporteur was Mr BROICHER. 
At  its 257th Plenary Session (meeting of 7 July 1988) the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion by a large majority, with eight dissenting votes and three 
abstentions. 
1 .  General comments 
1. 1.  The aim of the Commission proposal is to align the level and number of tax rates 
and stipulate which rates are to apply to which products. It is a crucial part of the package 
of proposals for harmonizing the VAT system. The effects of the planned alignment will 
stretch way beyond Member States' financial and budgetary policies: economic and social 
policies may be radically affected too. These general issues have been discussed in detail 
and dealt with in the Opinion on the Commission's Global Commmunication (C0M(87) 320 
final/2). 
1. 2.  It is to be assumed when examining the Commission proposal that imports will no 
longer be taxed and exports will no longer qualify for tax remissions from 1993 onwards. 
The  conditions  and  formalities  governing  VAT will  be  the  same  for all  entrepreneurs 
throughout the Community. 
The discussion took into account the Opinion produced by the Committee on the 
Global Communication from the Commission (C0M(87) 320 final). In particular, it noted the 
opening paragraph of the Conclusion of that Opinion that 
"The Committee welcomes the Commission's pragmatic approach in its 
proposal on the Approximation of  Indirect Tax Rates and Harmonization 
of  Indirect Tax Structure whereby fiscal frontiers will  be able to be abolished 
by 1992. 
Whatever decisions are finally made should permit as much flexibility to 
the  Member  States  (to  reflect  their  revenue,  social  and  economic 
objectives), as is compatible with the attainment of  free competition in the 
internal market. The Commission should reconsider the need for approxi-
mation of  VAT  rates on goods and services which are not  normally traded 
(1) OJ No. L 145 of 13 June 1977. 
19 across borders by non-VAT-registered persons and where different VAT 
rates within the Community will not distort competition. In determining 
precisely what margin of  flexibility might  be permitted to Member States, 
the Commission should consider alternatives to their calculation based on 
the current rates prevailing. " 
The discussion also produced the following comments, despite the Commission's 
failure to present any statistics on the financial impact of  the changes in each Member State 
making it very difficult to form any opinion, in particular, on the number of rates to be applied. 
2.  Specific comments 
Article 1  ( 1  ) 
a)  Number of tax rates 
2. 1.  The proposed restriction of the number of rates to  two met with very wide approval. 
However, there would be practical problems. Six of the twelve Member States would have 
to abolish the higher rates they charge at present, one Member State would have to introduce 
a reduced rate and five Member States would have to amalgamate two or more reduced 
rates in one. 
2. 2.  The ending of these tax gradations will have an undeniable effect, inter alia, on the 
relevant Member States' wage, price and $OCial policies. However, it would seem right to 
opt for two rates on administrative grounds, too (and especially with a view to the clearing 
procedure). If there is to be a wide variety of rates, the classification of goods and services 
alone may pose great problems. For example, views on what should be regarded as a luxury 
will vary considerably from country to country and will make it even more difficult to agree 
on a definition. 
b)  Level of tax rates 
2. 3.  The Commission does not propose uniform rates but merely specifies an upper and 
lower limit in each case. The standard rate will be able to vary by six percentage points 
(between 14  and 20%) and the reduced rate by five points (between 4 and 9%). However, 
these bands appear to be too wide for goods and services supplied to final customers. They 
are as high as, and in some cases higher than, the average net profits of industry in the 
Member States measured as a percentage of turnover. 
2.4.  Since after the abolition of intra-Community frontiers final customers will be able 
to purchase goods freely in any Member State, competition may be seriously distorted by 
such differences in rates. This will apply in particular to high-value goods (e.g. motor vehicles, 
jewellery and furs), mail-order selling and the sale of goods and services to final consumers 
in border areas. It must not be forgotten here that final consumers include not only private 
individuals but also public authorities, other organizations not entitled to deduct input tax 
20 and firms which, by virtue of being small etc, are not entitled to deduct input tax. There are 
also cases where the deduction of tax is not allowed at all on the purchase of goods and 
services.  The  Commission should also seize this opportunity to harmonize the indirect 
taxation  of banking,  financial  and  insurance  operations  and  to discuss  whether the 
exemptions which exist in this field are really justified. 
2.5.  The proposed bands should therefore be narrowed. Two partly conflicting sets of 
interests should be taken into consideration when the requisite adjustments are made. 
Because of  their budgetary situations or the other aforementioned reasons, Member 
States will not always be in a position to go through with such an approximation as a matter 
of course. However, if the aim is to be that VAT on goods and services in an internal market 
free of tax barriers should be neutral, a reduction in the differences between rates to around 
three percentage points would normally be likely to make tax-related distortions of compe-
tition bearable. However, one exception to this would be large orders which are placed by 
public authorities or other non-taxable persons, i.e. by customers who are not entitled to 
deduct input tax. This category includes banks, insurance companies and also religious or 
charitable organizations. A price advantage of as little as one percentage point can be decisive 
in securing such an order, and the governments of Member States where a higher tax rate 
operates may be under immense pressure in such instances to agree to further alignment. 
This may cause considerable budgetary problems. 
2. 6.  If not all Member States can approve an  immediate reduction in the bands, the 
Commission proposal should be regarded as only a transitional scheme. The bands would 
then be gradually reduced by laying down a schedule for their further phased approximation, 
which would force Member States to act by a certain deadline without depriving them of 
the chance to adjust beforehand. It is to be hoped that the transitional nature of the proposed 
wide bands will deter industry from capitalizing on competitive advantages on a large scale 
and, for example, setting up supply depots in Member States where taxes are lower. 
c)  The assignment of tax rates to goods and services 
2. 7.  The proposal to confine the reduced rate to major everyday goods and services is 
welcomed. The obligation to align tax rates should also not apply to the sale of goods and 
services which are  not likely to distort competition (e.g.  building plots, water, hospital 
services). The individual items call for the following comments: 
- Foodstuffs: All foodstuffs for human consumption and animal feedingstuffs should qualify 
for the reduced rate. For the sake of simplicity it does not seem right to draw a distinction 
between basic and  luxury foodstuffs. The existing zero rating for foodstuffs can be 
retained providing that it can be reasonably established that distortions of competition 
will not result. At the end  of a certain period a check should be made to see whether 
competition is distorted. If necessary, adjustments will have to be made. 
- Energy products for heating and lighting: All sources of primary energy (coal, crude oil, 
natural gas, etc.) and secondary energy (electricity, heat, etc.) should be included under 
this heading. 
21 - Water supplies: This is taken to include water for domestic and industrial consumption. 
- Pharmaceutical products: A precise definition is required here in keeping with Directive 
65/65/EEC'21• Apart from medicines, prostheses (e.g. artificial limbs and hearing aids) 
and other appliances for the sick (e.g. wheelchairs) must also qualify for the reduced rate. 
The same applies to dental prostheses. The Committee has already rejected complete 
exemption of dental prostheses from VAT in an Opinion of 3 July 1985'31 on the proposal 
for an  18th Directive on the harmonization of Member States' VAT legislation. 
- Books, newspapers and periodicals: The application of the reduced rate to these items 
meets with approval. Audio-visual media should also be eligible. 
- Passenger transport: The application of the reduced rate to passenger transport is also 
approved in principle, provided that no new aspects emerge from the passenger transport 
Directive on which the Committee still has to deliver its Opinion. 
Work in the housing sector should also be added to the list of goods and services 
to which the reduced rate is to apply, with the Commission being left to determine the 
eligiblity criteria. 
Article 2 
2.8.  Article 2 is too sweeping and cannot be approved. Although 31  December 1992 
should be retained in principle as the date for the approximation of  tax rates and the abolition 
of  intra-Community borders, certain exemptions and special schemes for individual Member 
States should not be ruled out. As pointed out above, both the reduction in the number of 
tax rates and the alignment of tax levels may cause considerable problems in the fields of 
taxation and economic and social policy in some Member States. Mention should be made 
at this point of the zero-rating practised in some Member States. In order that these Member 
States can give their fundamental approval to the approximation of VAT rates,  special 
temporary schemes must be possible on a case-by-case basis, as provided for in Article 1  5 
of the Single European Act. 
Thus, the Commission ought to be able to propose special temporary schemes (e.g. 
tax charged at  the rate applicable in the country of  destination) during the transitional period 
in  areas  where  competition is  likely to be  most heavily distorted  (in  particular public 
procurement and mail-order selling). 
* 
*  * 
N.B. :Appendix overleaf 
(2) OJ No. 22 of 9 February 1965. 
(31 OJ No. C 218 of 29 August 1985. 
22 APPENDIX 
to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
The following amendments, which received a quarter of  the total votes cast, were 
rejected in the course of the discussions: 
Point 2. 7 - fifth indent (books, newspapers and periodicals) 
After "with approval", insert: 
"However, several Member States currently apply a zero rate,  on the 
principle that it is wrong to tax knowledge, information, education and 





For:  2211 Against: 47 II Abstentions: 6 
23 OPINION 
on the 
Proposal for a Council Directive 
completing and amending Directive 77/388/EEC 
- Removal of Fiscal Frontiers -
(C0M(87) 322 final/2) 
25 Gist of the Commission Proposal 
The removal of fiscal frontiers means that intra-Community sales and purchases 
of goods and services will be treated in the same way as those transacted within Member 
States so that frontier controls on taxable persons as well as on private individuals can be 
discontinued. 
This new situation, which was envisaged from the outset and clearly foreshadowed 
in the Sixth Directive on the common system of value added tax (Directive 77/388/EEC), 
necessarily involves the abolition of VAT exemption at export and taxation at import within 
the Community, plus the adaptation of certain "territorial application rules" relating to 
supplies of services. Consequently, several provisions of the Sixth Directive have to be 
amended or supplemented and certain Directives which were adopted to offset the disad-
vantages caused by the existence of fiscal frontiers have to be either amended or repealed. 
The abolition of the remission of  taxation on exports and of the charging of tax on 
imports must not, in respect of Community trade between taxable persons, interfere with 
the principle that the tax revenue  arising  from the application of the tax at the final 
consumption stage should be assigned to the Member State where that final consumption 
occurs. This question is dealt with in a separate Communication to the Council; nevertheless, 
certain  amendments to the existing  VAT system,  required  as  a  consequence  of the 
introduction of the clearing mechanism, are included in this proposal. 
26 REMOVAL OF FISCAL FRONTIERS 
Rapporteur: Mr BROICHER 
OPINION of the Economic and Social Committee (CES 7  40/88) 
On 11 September 1987, the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, 
under Article 198 of  the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the: 
Proposal for a Council Directive completing and amending Directive 77/388/EEC-Removal 
of Fiscal Frontiers 
(C0M(87) 322 final/2). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions which was responsible for 
preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 22  June 1988. The 
Rapporteur was Mr BROICHER. 
At  its 257th Plenary Session (meeting of 7 July 1988) the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion by  a large majority with 3 votes against and 9 abstentions: 
1  .  General comments 
1. 1.  The proposal seeks to amend and clarify the wording of Directive 77  /388/EEC111, 
which will be necessary in the event of the completion of the internal market. The removal 
of internal frontiers will, in particular, require a new definition of the terms "importation" 
and  "exportation", since import and  export procedures will no longer apply within the 
Community,  but only  in  relation  to third  countries.  Most of the  amendments  in  the 
Commission proposal deal with the re-wording of Directive 77  /388/EEC. 
As this is an inevitable consequence of the abolition of internal fiscal frontiers, which 
is not in itself the subject of the following Opinion, there is no call here to adopt a position 
specifically on this issue. 
1. 2.  A large proportion of cross border trade within the Community is reportedly being 
carried out at present between companies belonging to  the same group. Under present rules 
companies in the same group within a Member State may elect to be treated as a single entity 
so that VAT does not have to be paid on transactions between them. It is suggested that 
an examination should be undertaken into the feasibility of extending the same principle to 
intra-Community sales,  as  this  would  greatly reduce  administrative burdens  both  for 
companies and national governments. 
2.  Specific Comments 
Apart  from  making  purely  drafting  changes  to  Directive  77  /388/EEC,  the 
Commission proposal introduces some new rulings with certain material consequences. 
These primarily affect provisions which the removal of internal fiscal frontiers will render 
obsolete or which, if retained, would have undesirable results. 
The following are the most important articles in the proposal: 
(  1  l OJ l  145 of 13 June 1977 
27 Article 1  (4): Re-definition of the location of a transport operation 
Up to now, the basis for charging VAT has been the distance travelled within each 
Member State. Since the distance travelled during one operation may cover several Member 
States, and hence areas under different fiscal jurisdictions, the removal of internal frontiers 
makes the existing ruHng impracticable. The new fiscal basis for transport operations will 
be the place of departure. We would endorse this solution in principle. However, in this case 
a mandatory procedure for deduction of tax by the customer should be included in Article 
21 (  1  )(b). It is moreover assumed that the separate Draft Directive which is to be issued on 
passenger transport will deal with further specific issues arising as a result of the removal 
of internal frontiers. 
Article 1  (6): Re-definition of the location of services 
Certain services (e.g. consultations, data processing, licensing etc.) are at present 
always deemed to be supplied in the country where the customer, if  taxable, has his business 
or permanent address. In future the place 01  ~upply  will be the supplier's country if the latter 
is a taxable person with a business or permanent address within the EC.  Otherwise, the 
existing provisions will still apply. No material disadvantages arise in view of the general 
deduction of input tax. Thus the place where such services are supplied is always deemed 
to be where the supplier is established as long as the customer's business is within the EC 
(regardless of whether he is a taxable person or not). The resulting standardization and 
simplification will be suitably practical. 
Article 1(8): Supplies of gold to central banks 
Supplies of gold to central banks are at present exempt from tax and also qualify 
for the right of deduction of input tax. Hitherto, exports within the Community have been 
exempt from tax by virtue of being exports. After the transition to the internal market, such 
trade will no longer be treated as exports. Tax exemption coupled with the right to deduct 
input tax must therefore be guaranteed by an amendment to Directive 77/388/EEC. This 
correction is in line with the considerations underlying the provisions for supplies of gold to 
central banks and should be supported. 
Article 1  (9): Option for financial and banking transactions 
The new proposal would abolish the right of option introduced by Art. 13 C-b of 
the sixth Directive 77/388, which applies inter alia to banking loan transactions. These would 
in future be exempt from tax in all Member States, as is the case for insurance and  re-
insurance transactions. This decision is premature. 
The present situation is in any case not satisfactory. It runs counter to the idea of a 
large single market and  a common financial area,  hinders the Community-wide provision of 
services across frontiers and distorts competition in contravention of Article 3(f) of the Treaty. 
The Commission is therefore asked to review the issue and propose a suitable solution. 
28 It would seem more appropriate to make optional tax exemption mandatory in all 
Member States with no restrictions. Accordingly it is proposed that Article 13(C) of Directive 
77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 be amended as follows: 
"C. Options 
a} Member States may allow taxpayers a right of  option for taxation in 
cases of: 
1.  letting and leasing of  immovable property; 
2. the ~ransactions covered in B(g} and (h} above. 
Member States may restrict the scope of  this right of  option and shaH 
fix the details of  its use. 
b J  Member States shall allow taxpayers a right of  option for  taxation in the 
case of  the transactions covered in B(d} above. " 
29 OPINION 
on the 
Completing the Internal Market 
- the introduction of a VAT clearing mechanism for intra-Community sales 
(COM(87) 323 final/2) 
31 Gist of the Commission document 
The primary objective is the creation of a soundly based and  reliable system to 
attribute to the appropriate Member State VAT collected on intra-Community sales, after 
the abolition of fiscal frontiers. The system must provide broadly speaking for a transfer of 
VAT collected in a Member State of sale to a Member State of consumption. 
A further important objective must be to propose a system which imposes the 
minimum additional burden on traders. A certain degree of additional administrative control 
would be acceptable in return for the advantages to be gained by abolition of frontier controls 
including the abolition of formalities concerning zero-rating on export, but it is important not 
to upset the balance of advantage. 
Another objective should be to ensure that the clearing mechanism fits into the 
existing VAT administrative structure of Member States with the minimum of disruption. 
A corollary of this is that the clearing mechanism must be grafted onto existing national tax 
collection systems, based on self-assessed periodical declarations of the tax payable. The 
aim here also must be to impose the minimum additional burden on national fiscal adminis-
trations. 
While a clearing mechanism which is not based on the matching of individual trans-
actions cannot be  completely accurate,  a system  based  on  a purely macro-economic 
approach is unlikely to provide an acceptable level of accuracy as it would not be based on 
actual tax revenue flow figures. Credible control and verification procedures would be very 
difficult to establish under such a system. 
Finally, any clearing system which is proposed must be self-financing, that is to say, 
over time and allowing for leads and lags in the system, the reimbursement of claims must 
not be allowed to exceed the flow of funds into the system. 
32 VAT CLEARING MECHANISM 
Rapporteur: Mr DELLA CROCE 
OPINION of the Economic and Social Committee (CES 742/88) 
On 11 September 1987, the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, 
under Article 198 of  the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on 
Completing the Internal Market - the introduction of a clearing mechanism for intra-
Community sales 
(C0M(87) 323 final/2). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for 
preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 17  May 1988. The 
Rapporteur was Mr DELLA CROCE. 
At  its 257th Plenary Session of 7 July 1988, the Economic and Social Committee adopted 
by a large majority, with 2 dissenting votes and 8 abstentions, the following Opinion: 
1.  Introduction 
As part of measures to complete the internal Community market described in the 
White Paper of 14  June 1985, and with the aim of abolishing tax frontiers, the Commission 
is proposing a VAT clearing mechanism to ensure that tax collected in the exporting country 
is reimbursed to the importing country. 
The removal of fiscal frontiers will mean abolishing controls on the carriage of goods 
from one Member State to another, with intra-Community sales and purchases being subject 
to the same treatment as transactions conducted within Member States. 
VAT would consequently be paid at the point of purchase, and  would later be 
reclaimed by the taxable purchaser. 
The proposal therefore consists of the following: 
1. 1.  Output VAT would be charged by the vendor in the Member State of exportation, 
and input VAT would be reclaimed by the taxable purchaser in the Member State of impor-
tation. 
1  .  2.  A clearing mechanism would be introduced whereby the output tax collected on 
export sales in a Member State would be reimbursed to the other Member States in which 
input tax is reclaimed. 
1  .  3.  The mechanism would essentially consist of a central account managed by the 
Commission services. Net exporting countries would be required to pay into this account 
and net importing countries would receive payments from it. 
Payments and refunds would be made on the basis of a monthly declaration from 
each Member State of its total VAT (input plus output) figures for intra-Community trade. 
Net exporting Member States would be debited because output VAT on exported 
goods would exceed input VAT on imported goods. Conversely, net importing countries 
would be credited. 
33 Each Member State would be responsible for calculating its final position vis-a-vis 
the clearing account. 
1.4.  Payments and reimbursements would be calculated by each Member State on the 
basis of VAT declarations submitted by taxable exporting and importing firms. 
1. 5.  As declarations would only be made on the basis of applications by taxable persons 
seeking to reclaim input VAT paid on imported goods and could not include VAT on sales 
to private persons and companies eligible for exemption, the central account would register 
a constant surplus. 
1. 6.  This surplus is to be distributed amongst the Member States in proportion to the 
volume of trade undeclared by importers. The method of calculation has not yet been 
specified and will be worked out in greater detail at a later stage. 
2.  General comments 
2. 1.  We are dealing with a Commission working paper - and a rather confusing and 
intricate one at that - as opposed to a draft directive. 
2. 2.  As a result, it consists more of a descriptive analysis of the proposal, based on 
general rather than specific aspects. 
The Commission proposal is divided up into a number of points, which will have 
to be examined individually. 
2. 3.  The Commission has set out its overall plans to harmonize indirect tax structures 
in COM(87) 320 final/2, and has issued a draft Directive for the removal of fiscal frontiers 
(COM(87) 322 final/2). 
As the clearing mechanism is part and parcel of the Commission scheme and, by 
extension, of the specific proposal to remove fiscal frontiers, it can only be examined by the 
Committee on the assumption that the overall scheme and proposal set out in COM(87) 322 
final/2 will meet with general approval. 
2. 4.  The terminology used by the Commission in its proposal for the removal of fiscal 
frontiers is likely to arouse considerable interest and enthusiasm. However, we must remain 
aware of the difficulties and constraints that lie ahead, and avoid illusions. As Europe is still 
far from being a political unit, the single market will have to make allowances for the 
autonomy and prerogatives of the Member States. One of their main prerogatives is that 
of raising taxes. 
On the other hand it must be  remembered that any system of raising taxes on 
business turnover will pose complex problems when it comes to monitoring. Checks are vital 
in order to ensure fair and equal competition. 
34 Nevertheless,  the Member States have  officially undertaken to form  a single 
European market. A market guaranteeing freedom of competition and reducing the adminis-
trative obligations of firms is therefore in the interests of all. 
2. 5.  The  elimination of tax barriers and  introduction of rules to ensure that VAT is 
collected as if  the Community were one and the same country, is scheduled for 1991; it might 
therefore seem that definition of a clearing system is not urgent. 
However, there are two reasons for making an immediate start laying down the 
details of the clearing system: (a) it  is a key component of  the overall blueprint and (b) Member 
States need to be given specific assurances that the new system will not place VAT revenue 
from  imported  goods  in  jeopardy  and  that VAT  will  continue to be  charged  on  end 
consumption. 
2. 6.  The Commission's format for a clearing mechanism is not the only one possible, 
and there are a number of alternatives to a clearing mechanism. 
It should however be added that other proposals should be examined in conjunction 
with the global communication or in the light of specific suggestions arising from criticisms 
of COM(87) 322 final/2. 
2. 7.  We shall therefore confine ourselves here to an Opinion on the proposal as it stands, 
regardless of possible alternatives and, most importantly, starting from the premise that the 
VAT mechanism is to operate as if transactions were being carried out domestically. 
2.8.  There does not seem to be much point in the Committee discussing the possibility 
of doing without a clearing system; in view of the inevitable opposition that would come 
from net importing countries, this does not seem realistic. 
3.  Specific comments 
3. 1.  The proposed system is straightforward in appearance only. In practice it will require 
extremely strict checks by national governments and the setting up of a sizeable Community 
administrative body. 
3. 2.  The Commission should take this opportunity to ascertain whether there are grounds 
for some exemptions in the field of banking, financial and insurance transactions. 
3. 3.  Only taxable persons wishing to reclaim tax would be covered by individual Member 
States' calculations of credit due. This would exclude: 
- all goods exported as a result of the movement of persons; 
- all goods delivered to non-taxable bodies or persons; 
35' -all goods exported by small firms with a turnover of less than ECU  35,000. 
3. 4.  This  would  lead  to  a  substantial  surplus  in  the  central  account,  which  the 
Commission envisages distributing amongst Member States on the basis of macroeconomic 
calculations. It will prove extremely difficult to make such calculations without collecting 
statistical data at frontiers. 
3. 5.  The Commission makes it  clear that mail order sales among Member States will be 
covered by the clearing system. However, it does not explain how. 
3. 6.  Net-exporting Member States, which would immediately collect VAT on all exports, 
would not be adversely affected. 
A special effort should be made to increase the efficiency of tax authorities with 
the most scant resources (in  many cases these are  located in the less-developed, net-
importing Member States). 
If it is  not to be  detrimental to net-importing Member States,  however,  the 
mechanism will have to function flawlessly and the effects of any obvious defects or hidden 
loopholes will have to be assiduously rectified. 
3. 7.  The Commission does not explain how VAT refunds are to be calculated for trans-
actions involving more than two Member States ("triangular" trade) or passing through a 
non-Member State. 
3. 8.  One advantage of the proposed mechanism for firms is that their obligations will 
be very modest, mainly the addition of two extra columns in the VAT declaration forms, 
covering the amount of tax relating to purchases and sales. 
The main disadvantage for importing firms is that VAT on imports has to be paid 
in cash at the time of purchase and cannot be reclaimed until later, by which time exchange 
rates may have fluctuated considerably (in addition, interest rates may be high). 
Similarly, exporters will be saddled with the cost of paying VAT to the national 
government before they themselves are paid for their goods (credit of between 90 and 1  20 
days is frequently allowed). This may be aggravated by the different rates specified by the 
VAT bands. 
3. 9.  The Commission claims that the Member States will have the advantage of being 
able to calculate their own debits and credits and settle them quickly with the central fund, 
rather than having to deal with their various trading partners. 
However, this will be offset by a total lack of  transparency in bilateral trade between 
two given Member States. 
36 3. 1  0.  Considerable  checks  will be  required  to ensure  that the mechanism  operates 
correctly. The Commission itself proposes coordinated control measures at Community level, 
including clearly defined audit requirements, administrative cooperation between Member 
States, greater use of sampling techniques and reliability checks. 
Accompanying national measures will be required; these will have to be harmonized 
at Community level to permit checks and enable effective administrative cooperation. 
3. 11.  A legal system of monitoring and assistance is therefore needed; as things stand, 
it is reasonable to question Member States' intentions of  taking prompt action in this direction, 
as they make little use of existing directives in this field. 
3. 12.  It must be stressed that the mechanism demands meticulous accuracy on the part 
of all Member States and complete mutual trust. Errors or carelessness would disrupt the 
central account, necessitating ex post facto investigations and checks in all Member States, 
which would pose enormous difficulties. 
3.13.  All Member States should make a special effort to eradicate tax evasion and fraud. 
The new mechanism could offer greater opportunities for VAT fraud, which is already common, 
for whereas at present individual Member States can check on both exporting finns and 
importing firms, under the proposed system they would only be able to check on the latter. 
The question arises whether it should not be one of the Community administration's 
tasks to cooperate in curbing such fraud and whether the Commission should not be given certain 
powers to this end. This is all the more necessary in that a tax authority which detects fraud 
by one of its nationals with respect to another Member State will generally be required to pay 
the amount in question into the clearing fund. 
Conversely, once transfrontier transactions are treated in the same way as domestic 
ones, false invoices and non-invoice sales could become more common unless an additional 
series of measures is introduced, which would be far from easy to apply. 
3.14.  In addition to opening a central account, a complex Community administrative body, 
as described in paragraphs 1  0.2.1. to 1  0.2.5. of the Commission document, would have to 
be set up in order to run the whole scheme. 
This would certainly be fairly expensive. What is less certain is whether the cost could 
be offset by a reduction in the administrative burden of national governments. 
4.  Conclusions 
Despite having decided not to study possible alternatives, the Section would offer 
guarded support to the Commission proposal, especially as the aim is to create a single European 
market where commercial  transactions may be  conducted  under the same  conditions as 
domestic transactions within an individual Member State. 
37 4. 1  .  Measures to harmonize indirect taxes and introduce a clearing mechanism, as with 
any other solution, will be effective only if  they are backed up by a new body of rules facilitating 
trade between Member States, reducing to a minimum any bureaucratic obstacles and abolishing 
the documents at present required for border crossings. 
4. 2.  In any event, the difficulties outlined in Chapter 3 must be resolved before the clearing 
mechanism (if it is finally adopted) can work properly. 
4.3.  For the long term at least, we must  aim for single rates of indirect taxation throughout 
the Community, to simplify matters and facilitate competition. 
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on the 
Proposal for a Council Directive 
instituting a process of convergence of rates of value-added tax 
and excise duties 
(COM(87) 324 final/3) 
39 Gist of the Commission document 
Now that the Commission has presented its detailed proposals in the field of indirect 
taxation described in the Global Communication, the proposed standstill Directive as  at 
present drafted is no longer appropriate. Instead, the Commission proposes a new Draft 
Directive which would prohibit any divergence in the number and level of VAT rates at present 
applied by the Member States whilst at the same time allowing, and indeed encouraging, 
convergence towards the number and level of VAT rates which the Commission proposes 
should apply by 31  December 1992 at the latest. 
Similarly, for excise duties on alcoholic drinks, tobacco products and mineral oils, 
only changes which converge towards the rates of duty proposed by the Commission would 
be allowed. The introduction of new excise duties which give rise to controls at internal 
frontiers would be prohibited. 
40 CONVERGENCE OF RATES OF VAT & EXCISE DUTIES 
Rapporteur: Mr DELLA CROCE 
OPINION of the Economic and Social Committee (CES  7  43/88) 
On 11 September 198  7 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, 
under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Proposal for  a Council Directive instituting a process of  convergence of rates of value-added 
tax and excise duties 
{C0M(87) 324 final/3). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for 
preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 1  7 May 1988. The 
Rapporteur was Mr DELLA  CROCE. 
At  its 257th Plenary Session {meeting of 7 July 1988), the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion by a substantial majority, with 4 dissenting votes and 3 
abstentions: 
1.  Introduction 
1. 1.  On 21  November 1985, the Commission presented the Council with a proposal for 
a Directive imposing a standstill on VAT and excise duties. 
1  .  2.  The European Parliament generally supported the proposal, but asked for a number 
of amendments to be made. One of these was accepted by the Commission, which altered 
its original proposal. 
1. 3.  The Economic and Social Committee issued a favourable Opinion (OJ No. C 207 
of 18 August 1986, Rapporteur: Mr DELLA CROCE),  but noted that: 
a)  the adoption of the Directive should not serve as an excuse for curbing or slowing down 
the harmonization which was vital for the building of the internal market; 
b)  the term "standstill" was inappropriate for the proposal of an  optional procedure for 
bringing rates closer together; 
c)  it was regrettable that the proposal did not include provision for the drawing-up of lists 
of goods and services subject to the various VAT rates in the Member States' systems; 
d)  the proposal did not consider the problem of goods and services which were zero-rated 
in some Member States; 
e)  an effective, formal obligation should be placed on the Member States to move towards 
convergence; 
f)  the number of VAT rates should be reduced; 
g)  the approximation of standard VAT rates should be based on the average standard rate 
in the Community, and should be weighted to take account of trade levels; 
h)  it  seemed ill-advised to exclude manufactured tobacco, alcoholic beverages and mineral 
oils from the provisions on excise duties, unless the Commission presented a specific 
proposal on these. 
41 1.4.  The Council has not yet taken a decision on the above Commission proposal. 
1. 5.  With COM(87) 324 final/2, the Commission has now presented a new proposal to 
introduce  optional  convergence  of the  number  and  level  of VAT  rates,  prohibit  the 
introduction of new excise duties or the raising of existing ones, and set out levels towards 
which any changes in excise duties on alcoholic beverages, tobacco and mineral oils should 
move. 
2.  General comments 
2. 1.  The  present  Opinion  is  of necessity linked to the Commission's other recent 
proposals on the harmonization of indirect taxation rates, particularly (COM(87) 321  and 
322 final). Here too we must stress the importance and complexity of  the subject; a thorough 
analysis is needed both of the present situation and of  the possible implications for Member 
States' tax revenue, company competitiveness, consumer purchasing power and hence 
overall demand. 
2. 2.  Acceptance of the general thrust of the overall Commission proposal would mean 
a substantial change in the conditions which engendered the 1985  proposal, and would also 
make the present proposal appear inappropriate. 
2.3.  By  1992, all Member States should have two VAT rates, varying within precise 
limits, and should set single excise duty rates. It therefore seems ill-judged simply to formalize 
the obligation not to widen existing divergences and to "allow" movement towards the rates 
scheduled for 1992. 
2. 4.  Given the difficulties which Member States have had in the past when amending 
their tax systems, there is a danger of arriving at 1992 with the present situation virtually 
unaltered. This would pose a serious threat to harmonization, as it would mean carrying out 
a complex and onerous operation in one fell swoop. 
2. 5.  It would seem  more sensible to propose a Directive which formally obliges all 
Member States to move gradually towards the final goal. 
2. 6.  The present divergences from the harmonized rates (in minimum and maximum 
figures) should thus be calculated. They should then be phased out in annual stages to be 
calculated in percentage terms. 
2. 7.  Achievement of the final goal could even be scheduled for a date after 1992, as 
this would seem unli!<ely seriously to hinder the removal of tax frontiers and the completion 
of the single market. 
2. 8.  Not only would gradual harmonization make the operation less risky and onerous; it 
would also mean that the advantages and disadvantages could start being assessed at once. 
42 2.9.  The difficulties which taxation directives and draft directives have invariably come 
up against in the past are a further cause for concern. These difficulties stemmed from the 
specific needs of the individual Member States, who have in any case traditionally been 
reluctant to accept Community r~les in this field. 
2. 1  0.  It is hoped that the reports which the Commission is to present in 1988 and 1990 
will give a more encouraging picture of the situation. 
3.  Specific comments 
3.1.  Article 1  (3) should be amended to read as follows: 
"3. Obligatory convergence of  the tax rates 
Member States must: 
a) alter  the levels of  their reduced and normal rates, moving them towards 
the limits laid down for harmonization on 1 January 1993, by  an annual 
percentage equal to 25% of  the differences between the current levels 
of  the rates and those which are to apply on 1 January 1993. The first 
reduction must be made by 31 December 1989. 
b) abolish their increased tax rates or  reduce them gradually by  an annual 
proportional percentage so that they are completely abolished by 31 
December 1992." 
3.2.  Article 2(4) should be amended to read as follows: 
"4.  Member States must alter the levels of  the excise duties levied on 
the products mentioned in Point 3, moving them towards the limits laid 
down for harmonization on 1 January 1993, by  an annual percentage equal 
to 25% of  the difference between the current levels of  the rates and those 
which are to apply on 1 January 1993. The first reduction should be made 
by 31 December 1989." 
3. 3.  In line with Point 2. 7. above, if convergence were obligatory, complete harmoni-
zation of indirect taxes could even be postponed until after  the scheduled date of 1 January 
1993  (e.g. until1995).1n this case, the figure of 25% proposed in Points 3.1. and 3.2. above 
should be altered accordingly. 
The  Commission  could  suggest to the  individual  Member States  appropriate 
compensatory measures when the loss of excise revenue in  any Member State is  so 
significant that it creates serious revenue needs, as a direct result of tax harmonization, as 
well as social and economic difficulties which could lead to wider disparities between the 
regions of the Community. 
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on the 
Completion of the Internal Market: 
Proposal for a Council Directive 
on the approximation of taxes on cigarettes 
(COM(87) 325 final/2) 
Proposal for a Council Directive 
on the approximation of taxes on manufactured tobacco 
other than cigarettes 
(COM(87) 326 final/2 
45 Gist of the Commission proposals 
1.  Approximation of Taxes on Cigarettes 
(C0M(87) 325 final/2) 
The taxes levied on cigarettes under Directive 72/464/EEC comprise: 
a)  a specific excise duty per unit of the product; 
b)  a proportional excise duty calculated on the basis of  the maximum retail selling price; and 
c)  a VAT proportional to the retail selling price. 
The harmonization, provided for in this Directive, of the ratio between the specific 
excise duty and the sum of the proportional excise duty and VAT does not make it possible 
to harmonize the rates of taxation. Having reviewed the progress made to date in harmonizing 
the structure of cigarette taxation, the Commission has come to the inescapable conclusion 
that a different approach from that pursued so far is essential if the necessary degree of tax 
approximation is to be achieved. 
The Commission proposes to lay down a combined rate for ad valorem excise duty 
plus VAT and a common rate at Community level for the specific excise duty. It has taken 
the arithmetic average of existing cigarette duties as the basis for the calculation of the 
proposal. 
This gives: 
a)  a specific excise duty whose basic amount is fixed at 19.5 ECU per 1,000  cigarettes and 
which is to be adjusted in line with the general consumer price index in the Community, 
taking 1987 as the reference year; 
b)  a proportional excise duty whose rate is to be fixed in such a way that the combined 
incidence of this rate and the VAT rate lies between 52% and 54% of the retail selling 
price inclusive of all taxes. 
The result of this combination of elements is to produce a level of taxation which 
will be higher for nine Member States and practically the same for two others (UK, Ireland). 
It  entails a significant fall in the level of taxation in one Member State (Denmark), where the 
current level of taxation is extremely high. 
46 2.  Approximation of Taxes on Manufactured Tobacco Other Than Cigarettes 
(COM(87) 326 final/2) 
The Council has so far not adopted any specific provisions for harmonizing the 
structure of excise duties on manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes. The purpose of 
this proposal is not only to establish a common structure and basis of assessment for the 
excise duty, but at the same time to determine the rates. 
The Commission feels that the best choice for a Community scheme would be a 
purely ad valorem system based on retail selling prices freely determined by manufacturers 
or importers pursuant to Article 5 of Council Directive 72/464/EEC, especially as such a 
system is already applied in nine Member States for cigars and cigarillos and in seven Member 
States for smoking tobacco, snuff and chewing tobacco. 
The Commission proposes that an ad valorem rate of excise duty be applied in such 
a way that the total tax burden resulting from the combination of the excise duty and VAT 
would be: 
- for cigars and cigarillos: 
- for smoking tobacco: 
between 34% and  36% I  of the retail 
between 54% and  56%  selling price inclusive 
between 41 % and 43%  of all taxes  - for snuff and chewing tobacco: 
In the case of cigars and cigarillos, taxes and prices will rise in Belgium, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Greece and Spain but fall in the other Member States. 
In the case of smoking tobacco, little change is expected in the Netherlands and 
Germany, while taxes and prices will rise in Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal and 
fall in the other Member States. 
47 CIGARETTE/TOBACCO TAXES 
Rapporteur: Mrs ROBINSON 
OPINION of the Economic and Social Committee (CES  7  44/88) 
On 11 September 1987, the Council  decided to consult the Economic and  Social Committee, 
under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of rates on cigarettes 
and the 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of taxes on manufactured tobacco 
other than cigarettes. 
(C0M(87) 325 and 326 final/2). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for 
preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 22  June 1988. The 
Rapporteur was Mrs ROBINSON. 
At  its 257th Plenary Session (meeting of 7 July 1988), the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion by a large majority in favour, with 2 votes against and no 
abstentions. 
1.  Introduction 
1. 1.  In the context of the removal of border controls in  1992 the approximation of 
taxation on tobacco products is particularly important because of  their special characteristics: 
they are goods of high value, low bulk, and widespread consumption, and can be transported 
across borders with ease. 
1. 2.  The Commission has brought forward two different proposals: one for cigarettes 
which comprise over SO% of the market and the second for manufactured tobacco other 
than cigarettes. These proposals replace previous proposals for the progressive harmoni-
zation of tobacco excise duties. 
1. 3.  The Commission's proposal for cigarettes keeps to the structure of a mixed excise 
(part specific and part ad valorem) as laid down in Directive No. 72/464/EEC. It also lays 
down a common specific duty and a band of ad valorem rates covering the proportional excise 
duty and VAT. 
1. 4.  In the case of manufactured tobacco othe:- than cigarettes, where there is no existing 
Community law beyond a common system of product classification,  the Commission 
proposes a common ad valorem structure and  sets rate bands for the various products 
covering both the excise duty and the VAT. 
1  .  5.  The Commission has not yet produced firm proposals on the mechanics of these 
taxes - how they are to be assessed and collected in the new context of a border free 
European Community. However, it would appear that a system of linked bonded warehouses 
is envisaged. 
49 2.  General comments on the Commission's proposals 
2. 1.  The move from a customs union to an internal market 
The Economic and Social Committee appreciates the desire of the Commission to 
present a pragmatic set of proposals for the harmonization of tobacco excise duties so as 
to cause the least possible changes for Member States when the Community moves from 
a customs union to an internal market. The Commission's proposals are based on a harmoni-
zation of the existing structures and rates of tobacco excise duties which were established 
to lay the foundation for the progressive movement, in stages, towards a tax regime which 
would ensure free competition in a customs union in which border checks were maintained. 
In the event, progress through the stages to the final stage of harmonization of structures 
for tobacco duties has been very limited. Equally there has been limited progress with the 
approximation of tobacco excise duty rates. So long as border checks operate on both traders 
and individuals some differences in excise duty rates can be tolerated within a harmonized 
structure since means can be taken to ensure that all tobacco products bear the tax rate 
of the country of consumption. The existing structures and rates which reflect the needs 
and circumstances of a customs union do not necessarily provide a sound basis for tobacco 
duties in a single, border-free, internal market. The circumstances of an  internal market 
without border checks are so different and give rise to such different problems of collecting 
and controlling excise duties that a more radical approach might have been more appropriate. 
The approximation of rates, as proposed by the Commission, is not so important for registered 
traders (whichever method of collection and control is adopted) since they will sell their 
products at the rates of tax prevailing in the country of consumption. The nature and value 
of tobacco products, and the fact that excise duty represents a high proportion of  their price, 
means that cross-border shopping by individuals will be encouraged by the absence of border 
controls. Thus a new problem of control is created. Neither alternative systems of excise 
duty for tobacco products, nor alternative methods of tax collection have been put forward 
by the Commission. 
2. 2.  Lack of data and analysis of  the competition effects of  excise duties and 
other factors affecting tobacco manufacture and purchase 
The Commission has presented very little up-to-date data or analysis relating to the 
effects of their proposals on prices and the consequent effects on tobacco growing, tobacco 
manufacturing and employment and importation from outside the Community. Nor do we 
have an analysis of the relative effects of excise duties and other factors on competition 
in the tobacco industry. The Economic and Social Committee regrets that the Commission 
has not undertaken and published the full social and economic study of  the effects of different 
possible harmonized fiscal structures and other factors affecting competition in Community 
markets which it urged in its Opinion on the Commission's proposal for a Council Directive 
amending Directive  72/464/EEC on  taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the 
consumption of manufactured tobacco (OJ C 138, p. 4 7 ff. 9 June 1981 ),  which request 
was a reiteration of a request made in a previous Opinion of 1976 (OJ C 204, 30 August 
1976). The Economic and Social Committee repeats its earlier requests for such data and 
analysis. 
50 2.3.  Difficulty in presenting a firm opinion 
The lack of alternative schemes, the lack of data and analyses of the effects of 
different taxation regimes and other factors on the tobacco industry and the failure to present 
proposals for the methods of assessment and collection together mean that the Economic 
and Social Committee finds it difficult to reach firm opinions on the current Commission 
proposals. The proposals will, as far as is possible, be judged in the light of criteria for an 
excise on tobacco products in an internal market. 
2.4.  Criteria for an excise for tobacco products in an internal market 
There are two sets of criteria on which proposals for the structures and rates of 
tobacco excise duties in an internal market should be judged, namely (  1) factors relating to 
competition and  (2)  collection and control of duties. Any tax system introduced for the 
internal market should reinforce free competition, secure sources of supply and variety of 
supply and of prices, and at the same time should not impose an  undue burden on any 
country. The Economic and  Social Committee has emphasized in its earlier Opinions on 
tobacco excise duties that: 
"The primary objective of  harmonization, laid down in the Treaty of  Rome, 
is to create conditions of  undistorted competition within the Community 
as a single domestic market, and that the possibility of greater inter-
penetration of  the national  markets of  the Member States is to be assured 
as a consequence of  the achievement of  undistorted competition in the 
Community market as a whole". 
To this aim must now be added the objective of permitting free movement of goods 
without the need for border checks. 
3.  Cigarettes 
3.  1.  The present system 
3. 1. 1.  Under the present system, as required by the Council Directive on taxes (other than 
turnover taxes) on the consumption of  manufactured tobacco, all Member States apply a 
mixed tax structure to cigarettes comprising (  1  ) a specific component -an amount per 1  ,  000 
cigarettes and (  2) a proportional component consisting of two elements: an ad valorem excise 
duty and VAT both expressed as percentages of the retail selling price. 
3. 1. 2.  As laid down in Directive No. 77/805/EEC the amount of specific excise duty must 
lie within the range  5 to 55% of total tax burden calculated on the basis of the price of 
cigarettes in the most popular price category. The ad valorem excise duty is calculated on 
the maximum retail selling price inclusive of all taxes (the specific excise duty, the VAT, and 
the ad valorem excise duty itself). The VAT is calculated in a similar manner. Proportional 
or ad valorem taxes based on the final selling price have the effect of multiplying differences 
51 in the manufacturer's pre-tax selling prices into larger differences in retail prices. Trade 
margins which are expressed as a percentage of the maximum retail prices further add to 
the multiplier effect. Differences between the manufacturer's prices for different brands are 
thus magnified in the final price. 
3. 1. 3.  Member States have had considerable discretion in setting levels of taxation, but 
home-produced cigarettes and imports must be treated the same by each State. 
3. 1  .  4.  As a result of the multiplier effect of ad valorem taxation there are considerable 
differences in price between brands within each Member State. These differences, however, 
are not so great as the price disparities between cigarettes from one Member State to another. 
3. 1. 5.  Under the existing arrangements producers and authorized traders are obliged to 
pay the excise duty due in the country of consumption (either immediately or when the goods 
are released from a bonded warehouse). There are considerable differences in the methods 
of collection and control employed and in the arrangements (including the periods of time 
before payments of tax must be made) for the collection of duties. Individuals are subject 
to control at borders to ensure that duties are paid at the rate prevailing in the country of 
consumption. An amount of duty-free is permitted. 
3.2.  The Commission's approach 
3. 2. 1.  The Commission therefore seeks to harmonize the level of taxation on cigarettes 
within the existing framework of a mixed tax structure. Prices on cigarettes between Member 
States have to be brought more closely together in order to ensure free competition and to 
permit free movement of tobacco products. Because of the multiplier effect  the ad valorem 
excise duty and VAT must be jointly fixed and there can be no flexibility in the specific excise 
duty. 
3. 2. 2.  In determining the total tax on cigarettes the Commission has calculated the arith-
metic average of the existing specific and ad valorem components in the 12 Member States. 
This results in a higher overall burden of cigarette duty in the Community as a whole than 
at present, and is thus in accordance with the Community's health policy1  11 • 
3.3.  Proposal 
3.3.1.  A specific excise of 19.5 ECU per 1,000cigarettes (to be periodically adjusted in 
line with the Community consumer price index). An ad valorem tax (excise plus VAT) 
between 52% and 54% of the retail selling price inclusive of all taxes. 
3. 3. 2.  These rates are to be reached by 31  December 1992 by any route determined by 
the individual Members as long as they do not move away from the agreed rates. 
(  1) For calculation the Commission has chosen the pure arithmetic average as the most equitable approach since it  gives equal 
weight to each Member State. irrespective of size. 
52 4.  Detailed comments 
4.1.1.  The choice of tax instrument 
The  choice  of tax instrument has  attracted  major differences of view in  the 
Committee, reflecting the diametrically opposed interests of a number of Member States. 
Those countries producing dark tobacco and accustomed to cheaper cigarettes prefer to 
minimize the specific element of  the tax, whilst those manufacturing cigarettes from blond 
tobacco and accustomed to the more expensive cigarettes would prefer the duty to be only 
specific in form. The former argue that an ad valorem system is simple and would directly 
reflect differences in "product price". The latter argue that a specific tax would not penalize 
the quality product. They also ask why tobacco products should be the only excise not based 
on specific criteria. In practice the Commission's proposal for maintenance of a mixed system 
appears to be the only basis for a compromise which would lead to a decision on a common 
system for the internal market. It  also remains to be seen whether  the Commission's proposed 
mix of the two types of tax (specific and ad valorem) is the most judicious. 
It is not certain whether the Commission's arithmetic approach is really the most 
equitable. In adding the specific rates and the ad valorem rates together, a certain weighting 
effect is inevitable to the extent that the level of these rates depends in part on actual prices 
in the Member States. 
4.  2.  Effects on the European tobacco industry and employment 
4. 2. 1.  Structure of  the European tobacco industry. The present structure of the European 
tobacco industry in the 12 Member States is best described as  "fragmented". Several 
countries grow tobacco and all manufacture and distribute. Several countries have state 
tobacco monopolies, and patterns of taste, consumption and products vary widely. The 
Commission  proposals  do  not  address  impediments  to  free  competition  apart  from 
differences in excise duty. It is therefore difficult to determine the precise effect of differential 
excise duties against other factors distorting competition. 
4. 2. 2.  Fixing of  the retail sale price for the purposes of  assessing tax. The Commission's 
proposals require the manufacturer to fix the maximum retail selling price of cigarettes so 
that the correct amount of tax can be calculated. It has been argued that any system which 
requires the manufacturer of a product to fix the maximum retail price of a product (even 
though the actual selling price may be below this) might be inconsistent with the principles 
of the internal market and with the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome and that this 
provision might be tested in the Courts. The ESC cannot make a judgment on the matter 
until the proposals on collection and monitoring are known. 
4. 2. 3.  State monopolies. No specific action has been proposed on monopolies controlling 
production and/or distribution. Where monopolies exist there cannot be free competition 
between cigarettes produced or distributed by the home Member State and cigarettes 
produced and distributed by another Member State as required in the internal market. 
53 4. 2. 4.  Effects on manufacturing and jobs. In those countries where the price of locally 
produced popular brands is at present low and will consequently rise when the Commission's 
proposals are implemented the effect could be substantial reductions in home production 
and an advantage to cigarettes from other Member States. The substantial reductions in 
home production would entail substantial job losses in the countries concerned. The general 
effect would be a redistribution of manufacturing location with consequent effect on jobs 
in poorer regions. 
4.  3.  Effects on prices and government revenues 
4. 3. 1.  Differential price effects. In Member States where the specific duty is presently 
predominant and which face reductions in taxation under the proposals (DK, IRL, UK) the 
decrease in price will be smaller for the more expensive brands. In Member States which 
will experience an increase in taxation, the increase in price will be greater for the most popular 
brands. Thus the proposal will enlarge the current price spread between cheapest and most 
expensive cigarettes in Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands and narrow 
the price spread in other Member States, notably Greece and Portugal. 
4.3.2.  Distributional consequences.  The use of the Commission's arithmetic average 
means that the most pronounced effect will be on the poorest people in the poorest countries 
where the least expensive cigarettes will cost more. In Portugal and Greece price rises are 
likely to be of the order of 200 to 300 per cent. The increase in price will be greatest in the 
countries with lowest per capita income. 
4. 3. 3.  Smuggling. Such large price increases in the countries which are to have higher 
taxation may generate an increase in smuggling from third countries. 
4.3.4.  Exchange rate fluctuations. Since the specific element of the duty is expressed in 
ECUs,  exchange rate fluctuations are likely to require changes in tax rates. 
4. 3. 5.  Revenue consequences. The revenue consequences will be particularly serious for 
Denmark and  Ireland  who also  stand to lose revenue under the VAT proposals of the 
Commission. Conversely, Luxembourg is concerned about the big increase in taxation which 
the proposal would impose on it. 
4.4.  Agriculture. The Commission says nothing about the effect on tobacco growing 
within the Community. The tobacco grown in Europe is the cheaper tobacco and the overall 
effect is likely to be negative on cheap products. There may also be an increased importation 
of light tobaccos from countries outside the Community. 
54 5.  Manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes 
6. 1.  Present system 
There is at present no common basis for excise duties on manufactured tobacco 
other than cigarettes amongst Member States. Countries differ, with some using a proportion 
of the selling price including all taxes, some specific duties and some a combination of the 
two. So  long as  the Community remains  a customs union  with border checks these 
differences can be tolerated since all sales bear the tax due at the point of consumption (with 
the exception of limited amounts of duty free tobacco for travellers). The purpose of the 
Commission's proposal is to establish a common structure and to approximate tax levels 
so that distortions of  trade and competition do not arise once border checks are eliminated. 
6.2.  Proposal 
5. 2. 1.  The Commission proposes that the excise duty should be a proportional tax based 
on the maximum retail selling price inclusive of  all taxes (excise plus VAT). Such an ad valorem 
system currently applies in the majority of countries. Nine countries employ it with respect 
to cigars and cigarillos and seven in relation to smoking tobacco, snuff and chewing tobacco. 
The Commission claims that this system has the advantage of simplicity, that it does not 
require rates to be varied or make necessary additional definitions. 
5. 2. 2.  The Commission proposes that the total incidence of these taxes should be deter-
mined by the arithmetic average of rates yielded by the sum of excises and VAT as follows: 
cigars and cigarillos 35%; smoking tobacco 55%; snuff and chewing tobacco 42%. 
5. 2. 3.  Because VAT is calculated on price inclusive of excise duty, no additional flexibility 
can  be  introduced into the excise duty. The element of flexibility is  expressed  as  one 
percentage point either side of the average of the combination of excise duty and VAT. 
6.3.  Effects 
5. 3. 1.  The incidence of tax on tobacco would be much lower than on cigarettes. On cigars 
and cigarillos, prices and taxes would rise in Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Germany and Greece (where they would more than double) and fall in the other Member 
States. With smoking tobacco, there would be little change in the Netherlands and Germany, 
a rise in Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal and a fall in the others. Snuff, which is 
currently free of excise duties in the UK would once more be subject to excise duties. Total 
revenue, assuming unchanged consumption, would be expected to rise. 
6.4.  Comments 
5.4. 1.  Basis of  approximation. With respect to smoking tobacco, it is not relevant to claim 
that an ad valorem system is used by the majority of countries. Eighty per cent of the 
consumption of smoking tobacco arises in three countries only, two of those have a mixed 
55 system of specific and ad valorem and those two account for 70% of total consumption. 
In the light of these facts it might be better to opt perhaps for a mixed system. 
5. 4. 2.  Price of  cigars and cigarillos. Taking into account the structural crisis which the cigar 
and cigarillo industry is undergoing, the proposed tax rates appear to be too high and may 
result in loss of jobs affecting some of the less favoured regions. 
5.4.3.  Substitution. The combination of the proposals for cigarettes and the proposals for 
tobacco would alter the price relationship between the two products and there may be a 
substitution of roll-your-own tobacco for cigarettes especially in those countries which would 
experience a huge increase in the price of the lowest priced brands of cigarettes. It would 
be sensible to take account of the price relationship in those Member States where both 
products have a substantial market share. 
5.4.4.  Snuff. In view of the proposed abolition of other minor excise, the Committee 
recommends the elimination of duties on snuff on de minimis grounds. 
6.  Health 
The Commission proposals have taken health policy into account in choosing rates 
which involved a heavier overall tax burden on tobacco products. However, countries where 
the price of cigarettes would fall as a result of  the proposals are concerned that this is contrary 
to the health policies of their Governments and of groups interested in promoting health. 
Although there appears to be no conclusive evidence that high prices are the determining 
factor in discouraging people from smoking, recent studies have demonstrated that high 
prices can lead to reduced consumption by smokers. 
7.  Conclusion 
Central to any appreciation of the competition and other effects of any particular 
form of tobacco duties is an appreciation of the effects of particular forms of collection and 
control. This is particularly significant now that the Community is to move from a customs 
union to an  internal market. The Commission has suggested that either banderoles or a 
system of linked bonded warehouses could be the method of collection and control and 
appears to favour the latter. But there is no proposal currently on the table which would 
provide the basis for a judgement on the appropriateness of one or another set of rates. On 
the other hand the health policy of the Community has produced proposals for labelling which 
would be language (and thus in party country) specific. In view of the lack of firm proposals 
on the methods of assessment and collection and in view of the lack of evidence from the 
Commission on the effects of their proposals on the structure of the tobacco industry, on 
employment in that industry, on agriculture and on Government budgets and personal expen-
diture, the Committee is unable to come to a firm opinion on the proposals now before it. 
The present set of proposals merely deal with the basic structure and rates of tobacco excise 
duties. But unless the method of assessment and collection is known it is not possible to 
comment definitively on proposals for rates. In the case of excise duties we seem to have 
56 the cart put to us before the horse. Until we know which methods of tobacco excise tax 
collection and control are proposed for the internal market then we cannot form a definite 
opinion on whether the correct structure and mix of structures is selected and whether the 
rates are appropriate. In particular we cannot give an opinion on whether the rates must be 
completely approximated or whether there is room for greater flexibility than is proposed 
by the Commission. Since all the revenue from tobacco excise duties belongs to the Member 
States there should be as much flexibility as is consonant with the requirements and the 
proper operation of the internal market. The converse of this statement is that there should 
be only that degree of harmonization of excise duties which is necessary to the operation 
of the internal market. 
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59 Gist of the Commission's proposal 
In view of the diversity of taxation in Member States and the wide range of uses 
to which mineral oils are put, the Commission has examined each category of products 
individually and proposed a rate of taxation which is particularly suited to the product sector 
concerned and is as consistent as possible with current practice in the Member States. 
The respective average rates (in ECU  per 1,000 litres) for each product and the 
proposed rate are shown in the following table: 
Product  Arithmetic  Weighted  Proposed 
Average  Average  Rate 
Petrol- leaded  340  336  340 
-unleaded  310 
Diesel  153  177  177 
Heating gas oil  62  50  50 
Heavy fuel oil 
(per 1,000 kg)  26  17  17 
Gases: 
- LPG and methane  85  61  85 
Kerosene: 
- as propellant  340  336  340 
-other uses  62  50  50 
It is expected that, on the basis of these rates and assuming unchanged demand, 
five Member States (OK, F, GR, IRL, I) will lose revenue, six (8, D, L, NL, UK, SP) will gain 
revenue and one (P) will be virtually unaffected. The overall revenue effect for the Community 
as a whole will be negligible. 
60 RATES OF EXCISE DUTY ON MINERAL OILS 
Rapporteur: Mr BROICHER 
OPINION of the Economic and Social Committee (CES  745/88) 
On  11 September 198  7 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, 
under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Approximation of the Rates of  Excise Duty on Mineral 
Oils 
(C0M(87) 327 final/2). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for 
preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 21 June 1988. The 
Rapporteur was Mr BROICHER. 
At  its 257th Plenary Session (meeting of 7 July 1988) the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion with no dissenting votes and four abstentions. 
1  .  General Comments 
1  . 1  .  The Commission's proposal for the harmonization of rates of excise duty on mineral 
oils is part of the overall plan for the harmonization of indirect taxes, the removal of tax 
frontiers and the setting-up of the internal market. Removal of tax frontiers will require the 
approximation not only of turnover taxes but also of special excise duties. The aims of the 
Commission's proposal  are  therefore welcomed.  But the practical achievement of this 
objective raises problems which the proposal for a Directive fails to solve or which could 
be solved differently. 
2.  Specific Comments 
2. 1. 1.  The Commission is proposing rates of  duty which, if adopted, would lead to a higher 
overall burden of taxation on mineral oil products in the EC. Rather than levying excise duty 
at the top rate, it would seem more appropriate to harmonize down to the lowest possible 
level in the light of the budgetary situations of the Member States. Products subject to mineral 
oil excise duty are generally used as inputs for other products or services. Increased costs 
attributable to mineral oil duty would therefore affect prices across the board. In this sense 
mineral oil duty is different from other types of excise duty which are generally levied directly 
on the consumer good. 
2. 1. 2.  It is to be  regretted that the Commission has moved away from the approach 
adopted in the proposal for a Directive on the harmonization of excise duties on mineral oils 
of 1 August 19  7 3111, where it envisaged a progressive reduction in the taxation of fuel oils 
prior to harmonization of indirect taxation. The Commission also pointed out in this document 
that this tax is a tax on consumption and not a tax on production, which is liable to increase 
industrial production costs. 
2.1.3.  There might in particular be a case for abolishing all excise duties on heavy fuel oil 
used purely for production; apart from representing a burden on Community companies, this 
excise duty also distorts competition between the various energy sources. 
(  11  OJ No. C 92 of 31  October 1973. 
61 2. 2.  The adoption of an arithmetic average rate for petrol is not considered appropriate. 
A weighted average would reflect existing taxation systems more accurately. The proposed 
lower rate of duty on unleaded petrol is particularly welcomed as a contribution to protection 
of the environment. 
2. 3.  In  some cases - e.g. heating oil - mineral oil excise duty is levied directly on a 
consumer product. An increase in the rate of tax would, inter alia, affect domestic heating 
costs. This raises the question as to whether it is defensible to tax heating oil alone or whether 
all heating sources should not be treated equally. It is contradictory to say, on the one hand, 
that heating oil should be treated with circumspection in view of competition from other 
energy sources, and, on the other, for certain countries to increase excise duties on heating 
oil by some 38% of the pre-VAT price. 
2.4.  In proposing that the same rate be applied to every product, the Commission's 
approach to excise duties on mineral oil is different from that adopted for VAT. The rates 
of special excise duty certainly need to be more uniform. Excise duties are levied as taxes 
on production to facilitate monitoring. Any disparities cannot be ironed out during the subse-
quent stages of the marketing process. The result is that lightly taxed products will be 
available for sale alongside more heavily taxed products. This can give rise to distortions 
of competition. 
2. 5.  The Commission proposal makes no mention of tax advantages for certain economic 
sectors or specific uses, as currently practised in the Member States. Such tax advantages 
should continue in existence and be harmonized and particular attention should be paid to 
opportunities for tax evasion. 
2. 6.  The harmonization of mineral oil excise duties will have a particular impact on road 
haulage and to a limited extent also on passenger transport. Whilst it is true that a lower 
rate of taxation on road diesel will, in those Member States where the tax reduction is actually 
put into effect, benefit these sectors, in view of the forthcoming harmonization of transport 
policy the taxation of vehicle fuel should not be dealt with in isolation. It is also necessary 
that road tax and similar charges, e.g. road tolls, be regarded as part of a single package 
and harmonized together. 
2. 7.  Neither the Commission proposal nor the Commission document on the introduction 
of a clearing mechanism121  specifies the method by which - as  under the VAT clearing 
procedure - excise duties are to be channelled to those states where consumption actually 
occurs. No definitive view can be expressed on this proposal, or on any other proposal for 
(2) Completing the internal market- the introduction of a VAT clearing mechanism for intra-Community sales, Working Document 
from the Commission (COM(87) 323 final/2). 
62 the approximation of rates of excise duty, until the details of this procedure are made known. 
If for example, as suggested in the Global Commission Communication on the harmonization 
of indirect taxes13l, the intention is to set up tax depots through which all taxable goods 
must pass when entering another Member State, this would amount to the retention of tax 
frontiers. And this would radically alter the views expressed on the excise duty proposals. 
The Commission should therefore submit its proposals with regard to the method of distri-
bution without delay. 
(3) Completion of the internal market: approximation of indirect tax rates and harmonization of indirect tax structure, Global 
Communication from the Commission (C0M(87) 320 final/3). 
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65 Gist of the Commission document 
The Commission proposes the following rates of duty: 
1.  Potable alcohol  1,271 ECU  per hi of pure alcohol 
2.  Alcohol in perfume, etc.  424 ECU  per hi of pure alcohol 
3.  Intermediate products  85 ECU  per hi 
4.  Still wine  17 ECU  per hi 
5.  Sparkling wine  30 ECU  per hi 
6.  Beer  1.32 ECU  per hi/degree Plato 
In the Commission's view, the rates which it proposes represent a reasonable and 
even-handed solution when set against the complexity and diversity of Member States' 
current treatment of alcohol products. 
Assuming unchanged consumption, the rates proposed by the Commission are 
expected to produce significant increases in revenue in four Member States (GR, I, SP,  P) 
because they do not at present tax wine and their current systems of spirits taxation apply 
very low rates to certain popular products. More moderate increases in revenue are to be 
expected in four Member States (8, D, F, L). In three Member States, (OK, IRL, UK), where 
current rates of tax on all alcoholic beverages are very high, significant reductions in revenue 
are forecast. A moderate reduction is to be expected in one Member State (NL). 
66 RATES OF EXCISE DUTY ON ALCOHOL 
Rapporteur: Mr DELLA CROCE 
OPINION of the Economic and Social Committee (CES 746/88) 
On  11 September 1987  the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, 
under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, on the : 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Approximation of the Rates of Excise Duty on 
Alcoholic Beverages and on the Alcohol Contained in other Products 
(COM(87) 328 final/3). 
The Section for Economic, Financial and Monetary Questions, which was responsible for 
preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 22  June 1988. The 
Rapporteur was Mr DELLA CROCE. 
At  its 257th Plenary Session (meeting of 7 July 1988), the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted the following Opinion by 80 votes to 13,  with 6 abstentions: 
1.  Introduction 
1. 1.  This Commission proposal is one of a series of tax harmonization proposals designed 
to help achieve a single large internal market by 1992. 
1. 2.  The proposal stems from the conviction that tax frontiers can only be dismantled 
when common rates of excise duties are charged uniformly throughout the Community. 
1  .  3.  It is  therefore proposed  that a standard  set of rates  be  charged  on  alcoholic 
beverages, and on the alcohol contained in other products, in all the Member States of the 
Community. 
1.4.  The Commission recognizes that the problem of excise duties is more complicated 
than that of VAT because not only the rates but also the structures of excise duties differ 
widely from one Member State to another at the present time. 
1. 5.  The  lowest standard  VAT rate  charged  on  the net  price  of a product in  the 
Community differs from the highest standard VAT rate  by only 1  3 percentage points, 
whereas rates of excise duty charged on wine differ by 280 percentage points. And if, in 
the case of wine, the effects of excise duties are combined with those of VAT, the rate of 
taxation charged on the basic price can vary from a minimum of 6% to a maximum of 380%. 
1. 6.  As far as  the taxation of alcohol  contained in  distilled  alcoholic beverages  is 
concerned, the difference between the highest and lowest rates of excise duty is 845%. 
Such extremes undoubtedly give us an exaggerated picture, but there is still no cause for 
optimism when we examine the whole web of existing differences in rates. 
1  .  7.  The Commission's policy on excise duties has developed over a very long period 
of time. As early as 1972  the Commission opted for a system whereby excise duties on wine 
would be determined by volume alone, alcoholic beverages would be taxed according to  their 
alcohol content and beers would be taxed according to their original gravity. 
67 1.8.  On several occasions since then the Court of Justice has taken decisions in respect 
of excise duties on alcoholic beverages. All of these decisions were aimed at solving problems 
of competition and preventing any kind of protectionism. 
1. 9.  The Commission is now proposing that excise duties on alcoholic beverages be 
standardized throughout the Community at the following rates : 1  271  ECU per hi of pure 
alcohol in the case of potable alcohol; 85 ECU per hi in the case of intermediate products; 
17 ECU per hi in the case of still wine; 17 ECU per hi in the case of beer (12.5° Plato); and 
30 ECU  per hi in the case of sparkling wine. 
1  . 1  0.  The Commission has not used a single criterion to fix the average common rates for 
the various categories of products. It realizes that the introduction of a single system of rates 
would have an extremely disruptive impact on the tax revenues of individual Member States 
and on the distribution of the tax burden between the different categories of beverages. 
1. 11 .  The Commission has therefore decided instead to adopt a pragmatic approach. 
Under the circumstances pragmatism is absolutely vital, although it does pose tremendous 
difficulties and inconsistencies. 
1.12.  The  Commission  has  considered  three alternative methods of calculating the 
proposed rates: an arithmetic average; a weighted average; and pure and simple approxi-
mation. 
1. 13.  An arithmetic average is out of the question because it  embraces exceedingly heter-
ogenous data and lumps together both small and big Member States indiscriminatingly; it 
also embraces an extremely wide range of consumption. A weighted average on the other 
hand would also have the drawback of allowing large, high-consuming Member States to 
dictate the pattern at the expense of small, low-consuming Member States. This would have 
a very great impact on markets and on tax revenue. The only possibility left is therefore to 
find the most equitable solutions on a case-by-case basis. 
· 1. 14.  Assuming an unchanged pattern of consumption, it is expected that the effects of 
the proposed rates on national revenue will generally be as follows : 
a)  in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal there will be a substantial increase in tax revenue; 
b)  in Belgium, Germany, France and  Luxembourg there will be a modest increase in tax 
revenue; 
c)  in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom there will be a sharp reduction in tax revenue; 
d)  in the Netherlands there will be a moderate reduction in tax revenue. 
However, the Commission neither provides background statistics nor quantifies its 
forecasts. This, plus the objective difficulty of evaluating trends in consumption and trade 
following completion of the single market, makes the task of examining the proposal all the 
more difficult. 
68 1. 15.  It is important to point out that in some cases excise duties on alcoholic beverages 
and alcohol are not a major source of revenue for Member States, but in other cases they 
are an important fiscal resource. However, quite apart from the revenue effects, excise duties 
on alcoholic beverages and alcohol have a significant effect on consumer prices. In Ireland, 
for example, a litre of wine which costs 1  00 units tax-free, costs 380 units with excise duties 
and 480 with VAT. In Denmark the same product costs 255 with excise duties and  315 
with VAT. The figures are only slightly lower in the United Kingdom. In all the other Member 
States the effects are much more negligible. In Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal 
there are no excise duties on wine. 
2.  General comments 
2. 1.  It has to be accepted that more homogenous conditions of consumer taxation will 
be needed in the single European market if distortions of competition are to be reduced and 
price disparities narrowed. 
2.2.  To achieve this objective, existing systems of charging and possibly excise duties 
themselves will need to be standardized. At the same time we cannot rule out the possi-
bility that all excise duties will be abolished in the more or less distant future. 
2. 3.  The Commission's proposal seeks to introduce common rates of excise duties in 
all the Member States of the Community. Given that its aim is to prevent unfair competition 
and make border controls superfluous, the proposal is as a general principle acceptable. 
2. 4.  The extremely wide range of duties currently levied on alcohol and on alcoholic 
beverages can be attributed to very different traditions, and different economic and social 
constraints, so there might be a case for allowing a number of disparities to continue, albeit 
within certain limits. The newly proposed VAT system, which provides for a choice of rates 
within a reasonably narrow band, could serve as a model here. 
2. 5.  Adoption of the proposal would result in the abolition of border controls although 
a number of significant barriers would still remain. Since products would, as now, be taxed 
at the place of consumption,  a system  of customs depots,  national identification tab 
procedures and special way-bills would still be needed. 
Needless to say procedures and regulations should also be standardized in such a 
way that they are not dissimilar to arrangements already in force in each Member State. 
In this connection we must regret the failure of the Commission to propose rules 
and regulations on customs depots or free warehouses. 
2. 6.  Like the proposed arrangements for VAT, common rates of excise duties would have 
to take effect no later than 31  December 1992. All Member States would be at liberty to 
make full or partial adjustments before this deadline. A more satisfactory solution would be 
to prescribe full alignment in stages. 
69 2. 7.  The deadline of 31 December 1992 must remain firm. However, given the obligation 
to gradually align rates before this date (i.e. with the process of convergence unquestionably 
underway, and with prior harmonization of excise structures), it might be a good idea to build 
up a system of provisions and derogations which would also permit the standardization of 
rates after 31  December 1992. 
2. 8.  Since excise duties increase consumer prices, their level should be set as low as 
possible. This is not what seems to be happening in the Commission proposal. 
2.9.  At the present time wine does not attract excise duties in five Member States of 
the Community, and in one other Member State (France) duties are extremely low. These 
countries account for 90% of Community consumption. It  therefore seems excessive to want 
to make excise duties obligatory in all Member States, especially if the impetus for doing 
so comes from geographical areas that account for only 1  0% of Community consumption. 
2. 1  0.  Wine should therefore be exempted from excise duties. Beer could also be exempted 
in order to ensure fair competition and because, like wine, it  forms part of  the normal everyday 
diet in many Member States. 
2. 11.  The  revenue  generated  by the introduction or reintroduction  of a tax on  the 
consumption of wine in certain Member States might not justify the extra red tape and 
administrative work which would be needed. Nor must we forget that wine is an agricul-
tural product in heavy surplus. A sharp fall in consumption due to a rise in taxation would 
make the present difficult situation even more serious and costly to the Community. 
2. 12.  The system of customs warehouses, which already presents problems in the case 
of alcohol and liqueurs, would appear to be wholly impractical in the case of beer, wine and 
sparkling wines, given that enormous quantities would have to be stored at special temper-
atures and in particular environments. Another system should therefore be devised even 
though it would certainly not be easy to bring it into play. The Commission has not yet 
proposed any such system. 
3.  Specific comments 
3. 1  .  Article 1 of the proposed Directive should stipulate that the full standardization of 
excise duties is to be completed in stages. 
This requirement could  include the introduction of provisions and  derogations 
making it possible, at least for some Member States, to achieve full alignment after 31 
December 1  992. 
3. 2.  It is still possible that "bands", rather than standard rates, may be proposed as they 
have been for VAT. 
70 3. 3.  The proposed rate of excise duty  on alcohol (Article 4) is too high. In four Member 
States it would put the price of the products concerned beyond the reach of the average 
consumer. The sharp rise would also work in favour of  the most expensive products where 
the effect of taxation on price is limited. Furthermore, it is inappropriate to adopt an arith-
metic average for spirits when the Commission has abandoned this approach for wine and 
beer. 
3. 4.  The reduced rate proposed in Article 4( 2)  for undenatured alcohol contained in 
perfumes and cosmetics is justifiable since the Commission does not intend to introduce 
excise duties on the products themselves. All the Commission proposes to do is tax the 
alcohol contained in the products. Denatured ethyl alcohol should be exempt in keeping with 
the Explanatory Memorandum (C0M(87) 328 final/3, point V). Reduced rates of excise duty 
should also apply to alcohol used as a solvent for flavours to facilitate its use and hence avoid 
replacement by isopropyl alcohol owing to the high cost of ethyl alcohol where it  is subject 
to excise duty. 
This exemption should not be thwarted by the lack of harmonization of national 
methods of denaturing. 
Mutual recognition of denaturing methods could be envisaged in this connection, 
at least as a first stage. 
3. 5.  The proposed common rate of excise duty on intermediate products (Article 5) is 
based on the principle of taxation by reference to volume. The rate is, by and large, calcu-
lated on the basis of  the weighted averages of  the rates currently applicable in the Member 
States. In general the Section approves this approach, taking into account the Commission's 
proposed definition of intermediate products set out in its previous proposals on the harmoni-
zation of excise duties; these proposals were approved by the Committee on 31  October 
1985 with one or two reservations (cf. CES 984/85 paras 1.5 et seq.). 
In this context it  is important to remember that intermediate products are normally 
obtained from the basic product which is partially fermented must or wine respresenting 
at least 75% of the final product. The proposed excise duty for intermediate products is 
therefore based on the fact that  the starting point is a fermented product (wine from grapes 
or their viticultural equivalents and/or wine from fruit) to which is added distillation alcohol 
in such a quantity and such a way that the product retains the character of a fermented 
beverage (cf. COM(85) 151, Article 2). 
It is also important to remember that many of  these products, which are basically 
made up of wine (port,  sherry,  Madeira,  Samos,  Vins doux naturals (fortified  wines), 
vermouth, Vernaccia di Oristano, Marsala, Passito di Pantelleria, Vin Santo toscano, Mantilla, 
Mariles, M61age dulce), have great traditions, are particularly important for the wine-growing 
countries of the Mediterranean and in some regions constitute the most important agricul-
tural resource (e.g. port and sherry). 
71 For this reason the taxation levied on  products derived from fermentation and 
basically consisting of wine needs to be very light. 
3. 6.  The provisions of Articles 6 and 7 cannot be accepted in their present form. 
With regard to wine, the Section would reiterate the importance of not further 
reducing the consumption of this surplus agricultural product, a point made with clarity in 
the ESC's Opinion on the Implementation of Agricultural Stabilizers of 27 January 1988 (CES 
83/88, page 6, point 2.9.). 
3. 7.  Taxing sparkling wines differently from still wines would make no sense, since there 
is no difference between the two types of wine either in terms of alcoholic strength (indeed, 
still wines generally contain more alcohol than sparkling wines) or in terms of value (at least 
with some qualities). The sole difference lies in the added value, and that is determined by 
the labour input. 
4.  Final comments 
4. 1.  The approximation of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages is a particu-
larly complex matter which the Commission would have done well to study in greater depth. 
4. 2.  It is absolutely vital to consult all EC Member States so that a proposal can be arrived 
at which, if not meeting with everyone's full approval, at least carries greater credibility for 
all concerned. 
4.3.  In particular, it is worth considering the impact of the proposal on Member States' 
tax revenue and attempting to forecast how trade will change as a result of the completion 
of the single European market. 
* 
*  * 
N.B. Appendices overleaf 
72 APPENDIX I 
to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
The following members, present or represented, voted for the Opinion: 
Mr/Mrs/Miss 
APARICIO BRAVO  KROGER 
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CEYRAC  ORSI 
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CORTOIS  PETERSEN 
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DONCK  RIERA-MARSA 
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FLATHER  SALMON 
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FRESI  SCHMITZ 
GARDNER  SCHOEPGES 
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GEUENICH  SOLARI 
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GOMEZ MARTINEZ  STAEDELIN 
GREEN  TUKKER 
HILKENS  VERCELLINO 
HOUTHUYS  VIDAL 
H0RSKEN  WAGNER 
JASCHICK  WICK 
KAARIS  WHITWORTH 
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74 APPENDIX II 
to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
In the course of  the discussions the following amendments, which received at least 
one quarter of the total votes cast, were rejected: 
Page 4 - point 2.1 0. 
Reason 
Amend to read as follows: 
"Wine should logically therefore be exempted from excise duties.  This 
would have to lead to the exemption of  beer  in order to ensure fair compe-
tition and because, like wine, it forms part of  the normal everyday diet in 
many Member States. Nevertheless, unless some special measures are 
taken, this will  greatly affect  the competitive position of  distilled products, 
with consequent effects on employment in certain disadvantaged regions. 
Consequently doubts must arise as to whether any level of  rates can be 
set that will not distort competition." 
The effect on workers in the spirits industry must not be ignored. Several thousand 
jobs could be threatened in Scotland and other regions of the Community where opportu-
nities for other employment would be limited. 
Results of voting 
Votes in favour: 34// Votes against: 46// Abstentions: 2 
Page 6 
Reason 
Add the following paragraph at the end of point 3.5.: 
"Nor  is it  understandable why  alcoholic beverages with the same strength 
as intermediate products (particularly aperitifs based on gentians} are not 
to be taxed at  the same level. This could be done by  reducing the taxation 
on the initial alcoholic content (the first 1  0 or 12  degrees could be taxed 
like wine}. " 
Self-explanatory. 
Results of voting 
Votes in favour: 25// Votes against: 61  //Abstentions: 6 
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